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School shootings have happened in the past and will happen again. The history of school 
shootings prompts all stakeholders to look at ways to prevent them from happening, and 
if they do happen, to be resilient. Change is needed in the prevention of school shootings. 
The case studies of Virginia Tech, Sandy Hook, E. O. Green Junior High, and Beslan 
school shootings reveal that the lack of information sharing and lack of communication 
were flaws; and the incidents might have been preventable. Prevention is a key element 
that both schools and law enforcement need to improve upon. In order to make strides in 
prevention, there needs to be advanced planning, continuous information sharing amongst 
stakeholders regarding those individuals that conduct themselves in ways that cause 
concern, a change in organizational culture with law enforcement and schools regarding 
sharing information, legal solutions, as well as resiliency if a shooting does occur. School 
shootings can never be completely preventable; however, it is feasible to have systems 
that prevent school shootings and increase the safety of the students and the community. 
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A. INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND 
The United States Department of Education reports in the Digest of Education 
Statistics that over 74 million people were enrolled in American schools and colleges in 
2008.1  The primary threat to our schools is an active shooter incident. If there is an 
active shooter, the ultimate consequence is loss of life. There will also be a nationwide 
impact; fear amongst students, parents, school officials, and the community that a similar 
incident could happen to them. In any school environment, the threat of an active shooter 
exists. The situation exists because of social and psychological issues with the aggressors 
as well as the “copycat effect.”2 Notable school shootings that have been studied have 
been Columbine High School, Virginia Tech, and Sandy Hook Elementary School. These 
incidents showed a lack of preplanning and collaboration between law enforcement and 
the schools. There has been research done on school shooters, the events leading prior to 
the shooting, the demeanor and actions of the shooter, communication from the shooters 
before the incident, and the planning phase of school shooters. 
Since there are known early warning signs that indicate a potential act of violence 
by those students, there needs to be collaboration in the forefront between law 
enforcement and the schools in the identification of and information sharing of the 
students that pose a risk of engaging in a violent act on campus. While schools have done 
their research and prepared plans, and law enforcement has modified its tactics for 
responding to active shooters, the two have not come together to work on the issue of 
identification, prevention, and collaboration ahead of time of those students that can 
become a threat. 
Exploring the topic of preventing school shootings as it relates to the 
identification of factors that are precursors and weak signals, and combining those factors 
1 Thomas Snyder and Charlene Hoffman, Digest of Education Statistics, 2008 (Washington, DC: 
National Center for Education Statistics, 2009). 
2 Loren Coleman, “The Copycat Effect: School Shootings and Recommendations.” In Confronting 
Violence in Our Schools: Planning, Response, and Recovery (New York: Simon and Schuster/Paraview 
Pocket, 2004). 
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with sharing of the information between law enforcement and the school administrators 
will lead to synergy. The collaborative efforts to minimize the risk of school shootings by 
continuously sharing information is needed since school shootings will occur in the 
future, which will lead to additional lives being lost. Preventing school shootings in the 
first place will reduce liability and fear while enhancing security, and, more importantly, 
it will save lives. School shootings are low frequency, high risks events;3 therefore, the 
collaboration component between schools and law enforcement should be considered. 
There were four case studies completed that provide opportunities for improvement: 
Virginia Tech, Sandy Hook, E.O Green Junior High, and Beslan. 
B. CASE STUDIES 
In the Virginia Tech shooting, a student murdered 32 students and injured 17 
other students and faculty in two related incidents on the campus of Virginia Polytechnic 
Institute and State University. The student started his killing spree in the morning when 
he went to the dorm room of another student and fatally shot her and then the resident 
advisor.4  The Virginia Tech Police Department (VTPD) responded and investigation 
initially focused on the murdered student’s boyfriend as a person of interest and excluded 
the possibility of a murderer running around on campus.5  Almost two hours after the 
initial shooting, campus administrators sent out a carefully worded alert to the campus 
community regarding the double homicide. As the morning continued after the double 
murder, coupled with the delay of sending out a mass warning message, students, faculty 
and staff continued on with their routine business for the day. Classes were not cancelled, 
and the campus was not placed on lock down. 
After the first shooting, the shooter went to his dorm and changed out of his 
blood-stained clothing, accessed his campus email, deleted items, and wiped out his 
3 Patrick N. Donavan, “Leading Community Risk Reduction” (master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate 
School, 2008). 
4 Virginia Tech Review Panel, Mass Shootings at Virginia Tech, April 16, 2007, Report of the Review 
Panel (Fairfax, VA: Virginia Tech Review Panel, 2007), 78. 
5 Ibid., 79  
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account. He then went to a post office and mailed his manifesto to a news agency.6 The 
shooter then returned to campus where he had brought his weapons, almost 400 rounds of 
ammunition, magazines, chains, and a hammer with him. He chained shut the main 
entrances at a campus building and left a note stating that a bomb would go off if anyone 
attempted to remove the chains. A faculty member found the note and notified a school 
administrator instead of calling the police department.7  Students found the doors 
chained, but they did not report it to the police department either. The shooter walked 
into a classroom and killed the professor and several other students. One student entered 
the hallway to investigate the sounds and was shot, which created panic.8  Students called 
911 and VTPD responded and arrived within three minutes to the location. In the 
meantime, the shooter went to other rooms and killed additional professors and students 
and injuring others.9  The massacre lasted approximately 10–12 minutes and within that 
time period, the shooter had killed 25 students and five faculty members, and injured 17 
others who were shot but survived. The shooter committed suicide, most likely after 
hearing the sirens of the police response and shots fired by police at the door locks the 
shooter had chained. This time, university officials sent out a message that a gunman was 
loose on the campus within minutes of receiving information from VTPD.10 
The shooter at Virginia Tech had been on the school’s and police department’s 
radar because some of his previous actions had caused them concern. The student was 
spoken to about aggression in his writings, admonished by the police regarding harassing 
students, placed on a psychiatric evaluation hold for being a danger to himself, and had 
been sent to psychological counseling sessions; these were all treated as separate 
incidents. Synthesis did not occur, and there was a lack of communication between 
Virginia Tech administrators and their own police department. 
6 Ibid., 86  
7 Ibid., 89. 
8 Ibid., 90. 
9 Ibid., 91. 
10 Ibid., 92. 
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In the Sandy Hook Elementary School shooting, the Newtown, Connecticut 
Police Department received several 911 calls regarding an active shooter. The shooter 
was former student of the school that was dressed in military apparel and had armed 
himself with several semi-automatic handguns, a military style assault rifle and hundreds 
of bullets with him when he entered the school. Once he entered the school, he shot and 
shooter killed 20 children and six adults, ultimately turned the gun on himself and 
committed suicide.11 The shooter in this case had previously attended the school he later 
returned to shoot up. He had been identified by school officials previously as someone 
that had psychological issues that needed to be monitored. The day prior to the shooting 
at the school, the shooter had gone to the school and created a disturbance. That incident 
was not reported to the police department where it would have created an opportunity to 
investigate the shooter at the time he caused a disturbance. 
The Green Junior High School shooting involved an eighth grader at the school 
and had started to be open with his homosexuality and wearing feminine clothing at 
school. His outward homosexual expression caused the other male students at the school 
to taunt him with homosexual slurs, trip him, or avoided contact with him.12 Another 14-
year-old student who attended Green Junior High School with the victim, Larry King, 
fatally shot him because of the advances the homosexual student displayed toward the 
shooter.13 
The shooter went to school in the morning and then retuned home and retrieved 
his father’s loaded .22-caliber revolver. The shooter concealed the firearm in a towel, 
stuffed it in his backpack and returned to school. Once at school he retrieved and stuffed 
the towel-wrapped gun in his pants, returned to class and took his seat directly behind the 
victim. After the shooter heard the victim tell a girl he had changed his name to Leticia, 
11 Connecticut Superior Court, Police Report Number CFS12–00704559 [search warrant], December 
14, 2012. 
12 Catherine Saillant, “CALIFORNIA: Tension High before Slaying: Friend Says Teen Was 
‘Embarrassed and Mad’ After Gay Boy Teased Him in School,” Los Angeles Times, July 8, 2011, Los 
Angeles edition, AA.3. 
13 Catherine Saillant, “1,000 Gather in Tribute to Slain Oxnard Teen: A March Organized by Students 
Focuses on Tolerance in the Wake of the Fatal Shooting of an Openly Gay Boy,” Los Angeles Times, 
February 17, 2008, Los Angeles edition, B.3 
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the suspect took out the gun and shot the victim twice in the head and fled.14 Immediately 
after the shooting, the shooter was apprehended by Oxnard police officers. At the time of 
the arrest, the shooter apologized to the officers for shooting the victim. The shooter had 
previously told other students that he was going to kill King, and solicited other students 
to jump and stab the victim. None of the students the shooter solicited reported the threats 
because they did not take him seriously. After the shooting, investigators found additional 
weapons in an unlocked closet in the suspect’s home, as well as swastikas, ammunition, 
and an instructional DVD on “Shooting in Realistic Environments.”15 
Ventura County prosecutors filed murder charges as well as a hate crime 
allegation and the suspect was tried as an adult. The shooter was tried, however the jury 
was unable to reach unanimous verdict for the crime of murder. Instead, the jury was 
deadlocked seven to five in favor of voluntary manslaughter. The jury unanimously 
rejected that the killing was a hate crime filled with white supremacist beliefs. As a 
result, the trial was declared a mistrial.16  Instead of trying the case a second time, 
prosecutors were able to plea bargain for a 21-year sentence for second degree murder 
and voluntary manslaughter in exchange for a guilty plea.17 This was a situation where 
school officials new of tensions that existed on campus, yet there was no communication 
with the police department to have officers patrol the campus for visibility during school 
hours or after school for police visibility purposes. 
The Beslan siege involved a group of Chechen terrorists that seized the school, 
taking over 1100 students and family members hostage. By the end, over 330 students 
were killed and over 700 individuals injured. There was much criticism of law 
14 Steve Chawkins, “Psychologist Says Teen ‘Snapped’ and Fatally Shot Student: He Testifies That 
Brandon McInerney Was in a Dissociative State When He Killed Classmate Larry King,” Los Angeles 
Times, August 16, 2011, Los Angeles edition, AA.1. 
15 Catherine Saillant, “Officers Say Teen Slaying Suspect Apologized: Oxnard Police Say Brandon 
McInerney, Accused of Killing Larry King, Told Them, ‘I’m Sorry, I Did It,’” Los Angeles Times, July 21, 
2009, Los Angeles edition, A.4. 
16 Catherine Saillant, “Mistrial in Killing of Gay Student: Jurors Deadlocked 7 to 5 in Favor of 
Voluntary Manslaughter in the Emotional Proceeding,” Los Angeles Times, September 2, 2011, Los 
Angeles edition, AA.1. 
17 Catherine Saillant, “Gay Teen’s Killer Takes 21-Year Deal: The Youth Avoids a Retrial by 
Pleading Guilty to Shooting His Classmate in 2008,” Los Angeles Times, November 22, 2011, Los Angeles 
edition, AA.1. 
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enforcement for what they did, and did not do prior to and during the incident. The most 
critical component was the failure to prevent the incident from occurring in the first 
place. Russian intelligence sources had information of a possible attack to occur in the 
area two weeks prior to the incident. The intelligence was shared with local law 
enforcement, which did not adequately staff patrols around and at the schools. The 
situation was further compounded when law enforcement did not inform school 
administrators of a possible attack. Secondly, response tactics were extremely flawed: 
there was no one clearly in charge of the incident, a perimeter was not established, and 
the weapons used by law enforcement caused the death of the hostages. The lack of 
incident command created confusion between the responders and the absence of the 
perimeter allowed for family members to advance on the school, interfering with the 
operational efforts. The positive takeaway was the extended state sponsored 
psychological treatment for the students and family members that were involved. 
C. RECOMMENDATIONS 
The following is being recommended, both to prevent and prepare for a school 
shooting.   
1. Advance planning and scouting of command post locations, staging areas, 
ingress and egress of traffic, plans for communicating with parents 
regarding response and pick up locations, and mutual aid response routes 
with input from the schools. 
2. Collaborate with the schools regarding threats by sharing information with 
each other early to establish a pattern of collaboration, communication, 
and trust. Examples would be receiving information from fusion centers 
and disseminating that information to schools, mining of social media sites 
by law enforcement for threats, and obtaining information about threats 
originating inside of the schools. 
3. Initiate dialogue with school officials for a long-term psychological 
treatment program for those individuals involved in a tragic incident. This 
will reduce the strain on law enforcement responding to mental health 







The challenges that are going to need attention are potential legal action from 
civil rights advocacy groups and changes in organizational culture. However, those can 
be countered by positive campaign actions by schools and law enforcement and by 
encouraging institutional change starting at executive level. The liability is tremendous 
for not preventing shootings when a situation presents itself where collaboration can put 
the wheels in motion to conduct threat assessment and follow up investigations. 
E. CONCLUSION 
School shootings have happened in the past and, unfortunately, will continue to 
happen in the future. It is necessary to place importance on the prevention aspect 
alongside the appropriate tactical response to safely eliminate the threat to those on 
school campuses. There needs to be collaboration between schools and law enforcement 
on a continuous basis. Law enforcement needs to plan its tactics and responses prior to an 
incident taking place. During the aftermath of an incident, there needs to be long-term 
psychological services available to those impacted. Finally, there needs to be quarterly 
meetings between the schools and law enforcement to keep the issue on the forefront. 
School shootings have made history, and they will continue to occur. Planning and 
collaborations needs to continue where it exists and needs to start where it does not. Law 
enforcement, schools, media, first responders, and medical staff need to work together to 
keep their communities safe and be in a position to best handle a school attack when it 
occurs. The importance of this is expresses in the Report To The President On Issues 
Raised By The Virginia Tech Tragedy, where it explains that many states and 
communities that have adopted emergency preparedness and violence prevention plans to 
address school and community violence; however, the challenge is fully implementing 
these programs through practice and effective communication.18  Putting plans into 
18 Michael O. Leavitt, Margaret Spellings, and Alberto Gonzales, Report to the President on Issues 
Raised by the Virginia Tech Tragedy (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, 
U.S. Department of Education, and U.S. Department of Justice), 
http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2007/June/vt_report_061307.pdf. 
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practice is necessary to do sooner than later. Just as necessary as the planning component 
is sharing of information between schools and law enforcement.   
The failure to share information from the law enforcement component to the 
schools left over 300 students, parents, and teachers dead in Beslan. The combined failure 
of the school and the law enforcement component within the school at Virginia Tech left 
32 students and faculty dead, and the Sandy Hook shooting left 26 students and teachers 
dead. In the Sandy Hook incident, the shooter had been involved in an altercation with 
school staff the day prior to the shooting, and on the day of the shooting he targeted those 
he was involved in an altercation with. Since the conduct of aggression, bullying, and 
fighting has been identified as areas for concern, schools, and law enforcement should be 
cross-reporting incidents that come to their collective attention. When incidents are 
brought to each other’s attention, then at the very least a decision could be made as how 
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I. INTRODUCTION: SCHOOL SHOOTINGS CONTINUE  
TO POSE PROBLEMS 
A. BACKGROUND 
School shootings have brought much concern to communities, school districts, 
law enforcement, and students. Similar events are likely, and there will probably never be 
a time where we can say with 100 percent certainty there will never be a school shooting 
in the United States again. The document Prepared Response: A Mitigation Strategy to 
Prepare School Communities for School Shooters states that school shootings can never 
be 100 percent preventable—just as other crimes are not. Just because it is not 100 
percent preventable, however, it does not mean that they cannot be properly prepared for 
or that a shooting incident cannot be mitigated by proactive measures taken beforehand.1  
For example, governmental agencies have recommended how to construct and reinforce 
schools to enhance the physical security of school campuses.2  What has been missing is 
the prevention component. While physical security is extremely important and schools 
have plans in place, the prevention component needs to be given thought and 
consideration.   
A key element to preparing a response for a school shooting is to understand what 
to prepare for. When the schools were polled, 95 percent reported that they had 
comprehensive plans for crisis preparedness, plans, and recovery.3  In contrast, a national 
survey conducted of more than 750 school-based police officers revealed that about half 
of them said that emergency plans for their schools were not adequate.4  For the 
prevention to be effective, there needs to be collaboration between schools and law 
1 Christoper D. Troughton, Prepared Response: A Mitigation Strategy to Prepare School Communities 
for School Shooters (Storrs, CT: University of Connecticut, 2011).  
2 Science and Technology Directorate, Department of Homeland Security, Buildings and 
Infrastructure Protection Series Primer to Design Safe School Projects in Case of Terrorist Attacks and 
School Shootings (FEMA-428/BIPS-07) 2nd ed. (Washington, DC: Department of Homeland Security, 
2012).  
3 Beth Schuster, “Preventing, Preparing for Critical Incidents in Schools,” National Institute of Justice 
Journal 262 (2010), https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/225765.pdf. 
4 Ibid. 
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enforcement. Without interagency collaboration and partnerships between these two, 
relevant information regarding potential incidents that could be lost. This could pose a 
threat in that a school shooting would not be properly cross reported between the two. 
Schools are in a position to observe and report those incidents that occur on campus 
during school hours, while law enforcement has knowledge of students engaging in 
deviant behaviors such as assaults, threats, narcotics use, and thefts while away from 
campus. The U.S. Department of Education newsletter Barriers to Collaboration cites 
Dr. Larry Nocera of Glastonbury Public Schools as advocating that the key to interagency 
collaboration is trust.5  Dr. Nocera recommended developing opportunities to connect 
various individuals each other as this helps to bridge differences and dissolve 
misperceptions of others.6  This can be done by sharing issues and training together.7   
1. Problem Statement 
School shootings occur in the United States where students that attend or have 
attended the schools commit violence towards other students and school staff. The school 
shootings that have been studied and have received notable attention have been the 
Columbine High School shooting, Virginia Tech shooting, and, more recently, the Sandy 
Hook Elementary School shooting in Newtown, Connecticut. These incidents showed a 
lack of preplanning and collaboration between law enforcement and the schools. 
There has been a variety research done on school shooters: events leading prior to 
the shooting, the demeanor and actions of the shooter, communication from the shooters 
before the incident, and the planning phase of school shooters. There has also been new 
training and tactics for law enforcement as they respond to active shooters. What has not 
been in the forefront of developments is the collaboration component between law 
enforcement and the schools in the identification and information sharing of concerning 
the students who pose a risk of engaging in a violent act on campus. The schools have 
done their research and prepared plans, and law enforcement has modified its tactics, but 
5 Readiness and Emergency Management for Schools [REMS] Technical Assistance Center, 
“Highlights in the Field,” REMS Express 4, no. 2 (2008). 
6 Ibid. 
7 Ibid.  
 2 
                                                 
the two have not come together to work on the issue of identification, prevention, and 
collaboration ahead of time of those students that can become a threat. 
School and law enforcement officials need to realize the importance of 
collaboration, specifically sharing information with each other about as behavioral issues 
of students are identified that could become a threat. This type of collaboration needed in 
efforts to minimize potential school shootings in the future. It is necessary to explore the 
topic of school shootings prevention as it relates to the identification of factors that are 
precursors (or weak signals) and the sharing of the information between law enforcement 
and the school administrators in an effort to minimize the risk of school shootings. This is 
an important area of research since school shootings can be expected to occur in the 
future and these will lead to additional lives being lost. 
2. History Has Made an Impact 
School shootings have been occurring in the United States since the 1960s. Over 
70 school shootings have occurred in the United States where dozens of people have been 
killed and seriously injured.8 The book Creating Safe Schools describes school shootings, 
like the one at Columbine High School, which ultimately stimulated the development of 
safe school plans.9 In some districts, the safe school plans are dusty documents that 
administrators can refer to and show that they are harboring safe schools in their school 
districts.10  When school administrators have such a mentality, it jeopardizes the safety 
and security of the students, staff, community, and first responders. When school officials 
disregard the practice of providing continuous safety mechanisms, it also brings forth 
enormous liability towards the school district.11 
8 “Timeline of School Shootings,” U.S News, February 15, 2008, 
http://www.usnews.com/news/national/articles/2008/02/15/timeline-of-school-shootings; “Mass Shootings 
in America: A History, 1999 through 2013,” News Wire Service/New York Daily News, September 16, 
2013, accessed October 28, 2013, http://www.nydailynews.com/news/national/mass-shootings-central-
american-history-article-1.1457514.  
9 Katherine T. Bucher and M. Lee Manning, “Creating Safe Schools,” The Clearing House 79, no. 1 
(2005): 55–60. 
10 Ibid. 
11 Alissa J. Kramen, Kelly R. Massey, and Howard W. Timm, Guide for Preventing and Responding 
to School Violence, 2nd ed. (Monterey, CA: Defense Personnel Security Research Center, 2009).  
 3 
                                                 
Unfortunately, school shootings have created history in the United States and 
abroad. Previous Homeland Security Secretary Chertoff has said that we need to consider 
the issue of school safety because we live in a world where both domestically and 
overseas we have to be concerned about the likelihood of people carrying out violence in 
our schools.12  The motivations could be varied: driven by terrorists, psychiatric 
disabilities, or personal reasons.13 
a. Notable School Shootings 
Some of the more notorious schools shootings in the United States that 
have received much national and international media coverage have been the Columbine 
High School massacre in Colorado, the Virginia Tech massacre in Virginia, and the 
Sandy Hook Elementary School shooting in Connecticut. The Columbine High School 
shooting resulted in the death of 12 students and a teacher and injured 24 other students. 
The shooters were other students from the school, Dylan Klebold and Eric Harris. The 
perpetrators motive was to kill as many students and teachers as they could before ending 
their own lives. The suspects eventually turned their weapons on themselves and ended 
their own lives.14   
In the second incident, Virginia Tech shooting left 32 students and faculty 
members dead.15 Another 17 students and faculty were injured when they were shot and 
survived, and six were injured when they jumped from classroom windows trying to 
escape the massacre. The shooter was another student from the school, Seung Hui Cho, 
whose motive for the shootings was unknown. Like the shooters of the Columbine High 
School incident, Cho eventually turned his weapon on himself and committed suicide.16   
12 Michael Chertoff, “Remarks by Homeland Security Secretary Michael Chertoff at a Securing the 
Schools Initiative Event Remarks at a Securing the Schools Initiative Event,” Alexandria, VA, October 30, 
2007, https://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=483217. 
13 Ibid. 
14 Columbine Review Commission, The Report of Governor Bill Owens, 2001, State of Colorado, 
http://www.state.co.us/columbine/Columbine_20Report_WEB.pdf. 
15 Ian Shapira and Tom Jackman, “Gunman Kills 32 at Virginia Tech in Deadliest Shooting in U.S. 
History,” The Washington Post, April 17, 2007. 
16 Virginia Tech Review Panel, Mass Shootings at Virginia Tech, April 16, 2007, Report of the Review 
Panel (Fairfax, VA: Virginia Tech Review Panel, 2007). 
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The third incident, the Sandy Hook Elementary shooting, left 20 students 
and six adults dead.17  The shooter, Adam Lanza, was previously a student from the 
school he returned to shoot up; and, like the Virginia Tech shooter, Lanza’s motive for 
the shooting was unknown.18  Lanza eventually turned his weapon on himself and 
committed suicide.19  
In Santa Monica, California, on June 7, 2013, a former Santa Monica 
College student fatally shot and killed his father and brother after setting their house on 
fire. The gunman then carjacked, kidnapped a motorist, and drove to the college. On the 
way to the college, he shot at a police officer and a bus. The shooter made it to the 
campus, where he fatally shot an employee and then his daughter, who died two days 
later. The gunman entered the library and was killed by police officers.20   
3. Change is Needed 
At the time this paper was being written, additional news reports of school 
shootings have occurred.21  The incidents of shootings on school campuses have caused 
concern for parents, school officials, law enforcement, and the community. In the United 
States Secret Service Interim Report on the Prevention of Targeted Violence in Schools, it 
makes a finding that high-profile school shootings over the past 10 years have led to 
increased fear amongst educators, parents, and students.22  The fear may differ between 
17 “Danbury State’s Attorney Releases Information on December 14, 2012, Incident at Sandy Hook 
Elementary School,” State of Connecticut Department of Emergency Services & Public Protection, news 
release, March 28, 2013, http://www.ct.gov/despp/cwp/view.asp?Q=521730.  
18 “Frustrating Search for Newtown, Conn., Shooter Adam Lanza’s Motive,” Tampa Bay Times, 
December 24, 2012, http://www.tampabay.com/news/nation/frustrating-search-for-newtown-conn-shooter-
adam-lanzas-motive/1267513.  
19 Connecticut Superior Court, Police Report Number CFS12–00704559 [search warrant], December 
14, 2012. 
20 John Bacon, “Santa Monica Shootings Claim Fifth Victim,” USA Today, June 10, 2013, 
http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2013/06/09/santa-monica-shooting-john-zawahri/2405015/. 
21 “Boy Charged with Attempted Murder in Baltimore School Shooting,” Reuters, August 29, 2012, 
http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/08/29/us-usa-baltimore-shooting-idUSBRE87S16D20120829. 
22 U.S. Secret Service, Interim Report on the Prevention of Targeted Violence in Schools (Washington, 
DC: U.S. Secret Service, 2000). 
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students, parent, and educators, but since the fear exists, preparedness is not only 
necessary, but should be mandatory.    
In 2002, the Secret Service conducted a study of 37 school shootings from 
December 1974 to May 2000 and concluded that 93 percent of the school attackers in the 
study behaved in a way that caused others the feeling of trepidation prior to the 
shooting.23 
A key element to preparing a response for a school shooting is to understand what 
to prepare for. When the schools were polled regarding the issue, almost all of them of 
them reported they had comprehensive plans for crisis preparedness.24  However, school-
based police officers gave a differing view in that about half of 750 polled officers polled 
felt that the emergency plans for their schools were inadequate.25 The statistics show that 
there is a disconnection between the viewpoints of schools, who feeling prepared, and the 
school-based officers, who do not believe the schools are prepared. 
Schools are responsible for the safety and welfare of the students when it is in 
session, and schools in urban cities usually have security staff on campus to address the 
day-to-day issues. Some of the major metropolitan cities have schools that have their own 
police force; for example the Los Angeles Unified School District has the Los Angeles 
School Police Department (LASPD) that employs approximately 350 sworn officers and 
is the largest independent school police department in the United States.26 LASPD’s 
mission statement is to assist students, teachers, and administrators and in providing a 
safe school environment in which the educational development can occur.27  If the school 
environment is unsafe or perceived to be unsafe, parents will hesitate to send their 
children to such an institution. Also, if constant worrying about their own safety distracts 
students, they will have a difficult time concentrating on their studies. An associated 
23 Schuster, “Preventing, Preparing for Critical Incidents.” 
24 Ibid. 
25 Ibid. 




                                                 
issue with an unsafe school environment would be recruiting and retaining teachers into a 
work environment that they feel would subject them to peril. 
School shootings are of a nationwide concern as evidenced in the report to 
Congress: The Safe and Drug Free Schools and Communities Program: Background and 
Context.28  In addition, the community at large has dictated a demand for school safety. 
For example, legislators in the state of Washington passed a law and provided funding for 
safe schools where the superintendent of public instruction (SPI) must establish timelines 
for school districts to develop individual comprehensive safe school plans. The school 
districts are then obligated to report progress of their comprehensive plans to SPI on a 
recurring basis. The Washington Association of Sheriffs and Police Chiefs (WASPC) is 
also required to construct and operate a state-wide first responder building and mapping 
information system. Since 2003, the Washington Legislature has provided funding 
through WASPC to assess and map the security of schools in Washington.29  For other 
jurisdictions to create safe schools, the school districts can apply for federal grants via the 
Safe Schools Healthy Students Initiative.30   
4. Expected Outcomes 
The expected outcomes from the research will show three things; 
• There is a breakdown in communication between key stakeholders,  
• There are missed signals by individuals involved, and  
• There needs to be improvements in the law enforcement community and 
educational institutions in order to minimize future school shootings. 
B. RESEARCH QUESTION  
What can law enforcement agencies and school districts do to better share 
information regarding students that may pose risk of committing a shooting on campus? 
28 Edith Fairman Cooper, The Safe and Drug Free Schools and Communities Program: Background 
and Context (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2006).  
29 State of Washington Senate Bill Report SSB 5097, Washington State Legislature, April 20, 2007, 
http://apps.leg.wa.gov/documents/billdocs/2007–08/Pdf/Bill%20Reports/Senate/5097-S.SBR.pdf. 
30 “Safe Schools Healthy Students Initiative,” U.S. Departments of Health and Human Services, 
Education, and Justice, last modified May 29, 2013, http://www.sshs.samhsa.gov/initiative/default.aspx. 
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C. METHODOLOGY 
This thesis looks at several case studies involving school shootings: Sandy Hook 
Elementary school shooting, the Virginia Tech school shooting, the Green Junior High 
School shooting in Oxnard, California, and the Beslan school shooting in Odessa, Russia. 
The Sandy Hook Elementary school shooting was chosen because it is recent and 
involves a mentally unstable teenager who attacked the elementary school he had 
previously attended. The perpetrator shot and killed those that were younger than he was 
and then took his own life. The Virginia Tech shooting was chosen because it involved a 
mentally unstable perpetrator in college as a student. The Virginia Tech perpetrator had 
made a video prior to committing the shooting, and, like the Sandy Hook shooter, the 
individual ended up taking his own life. The Green Junior High School shooting was 
chosen because it involved a teenage perpetrator shooting another student on campus 
because the perpetrator viewed the victim as a homosexual. In this case, the perpetrator 
did not commit suicide, as compared to Sandy Hook and Virginia Tech shootings; he was 
apprehended by the police and tried for murder. In Beslan, Russia, the shooting, 
conducted by a splinter group of Chechen rebels, was a prime example of a failure to 
share information by law enforcement with the school regarding potential threats to the 
school. 
The sources of data and evidence used are government publications, literature, 
and after action reports related to the Sandy Hook, Virginia Tech, Green Junior High 
School, and Beslan shooting incidents. The steps of the analysis are: to gather the data, 
review the sources, and compare and contrast the similarities and differences of the case 
studies involving the Sandy Hook, Virginia Tech, Green Junior High School, and Beslan 
shooting incidents. The research focuses on the mental and psychological factors known 
about the perpetrators before the shootings, whether or not the mental conditions known 
about the perpetrator was known to the schools, law enforcement, or both, and will 
attempt to determine whether the schools and or law enforcement shared the knowledge 
that they knew prior to the shootings. Having the research scoped in such a manner will 
produce the answers to these topics. The finished product includes the lessons learned 
from the Sandy Hook, Virginia Tech, Green Junior High School, and Beslan shooting 
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incidents, and it identify what schools and law enforcement failed to communicate. The 
thesis also includes a set of recommendations and an analysis of the recommendations 
including the strengths, weaknesses, and challenges to implementation and use of each 
recommendation. 
D. LITERATURE REVIEW 
A literature review was conducted on the planning and preparation for school 
shootings. The categories that surfaced during the research addressed the history of 
school shootings, the planning perspective of school shootings, physical security to 
schools to prevent school shooting, and social implications. The literature can be broken 
down into literature from governmental sources, theses, the U.S. Secret Service (USSS), 
Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), technological study groups, security 
study groups, and psychology researchers, and medical journals. The components 
involved were the schools, law enforcement, first responders, and the media.   
1. Governmental Publications and Theses 
a. History and Background Addressed in Government Publications 
and Theses 
School shootings are low frequency, high risks events; therefore, the 
planning component is essential to ensure preparedness. Patrick Donavan’s thesis 
indicates there has been a lack of preparedness among the disciplines31 and reinforces 
that fact that the lack of preparedness continues. In addition, it addresses the planning 
component, dealing with school shootings, and looking at national standards for handling 
school shootings.   
A review of the literature for school shootings from the Department of 
Education Digest of Education Statistics provided statistics that over 74 million people 
were enrolled in American schools and colleges in 2008 from elementary school through 
31 Patrick N. Donavan, “Leading Community Risk Reduction,” (master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate 
School, 2008). 
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college.32 The United States Department of Education states in its Annual Report on 
School Safety that schools are among the safest places for students to be on a day-to-day 
basis and that any school crime is too much.33  This statement is designed to appease 
stakeholders and appeals to emotional sentiments. With the millions of students attending 
U.S. schools, some student somewhere is going to commit a school shooting. Indeed, in 
the course of this research, news agencies reported additional school shootings.34  
I relied on the findings provided by U.S. Secret Service because it is a 
governmental agency and its service members are experts in the threat assessment 
discipline. I reviewed the United States Secret Service Interim Report on the Prevention 
of Targeted Violence in Schools, which stated that several high-profile shootings in 
schools over the past decade have resulted in increased fear among students, parents, and 
educators.35 In 2002, the U.S. Secret Service (USSS) conducted a study of 37 school 
shootings from December1974 to May 2000 and concluded that 93 percent of school 
attackers from the 37 incidents behaved in a way that caused concern to others.36 The 
USSS conducts threat assessments as part of its protection mission as a core component 
of its work: the model of a threat assessment was carried over to the school-shooting 
scenario. The USSS report, Preventing School Shootings, states that most shooting 
incidents were not resolved by law enforcement intervention; in fact, more than half of 
the attacks ended before law enforcement responded to the scene despite law 
enforcement’s prompt response.37  Faculty or fellow students stopped the attacker, the 
attacker either stopped shooting on his own, or committed suicide.38  
32 Thomas Snyder and Charlene Hoffman, Digest of Education Statistics, 2008 (Washington, DC: 
National Center for Education Statistics, 2009).  
33 U.S Department of Education, Annual Report on School Safety (Washington, DC: U.S Department 
of Education, 1998). 
34 Reuters, “Boy Charged with Attempted Murder.” 
35 Bryan Vossekuil, Robert A. Fein, Marisa Reddy, Randy Borum, William Modzeleski. The Final 
Report and Findings of the Safe School Initiative: Implications for the Prevention of School Attacks in the 
United States (Washington, DC: U.S. Secret Service and U.S. Department of Education, 2002). 
36 Schuster, “Preventing, Preparing for Critical Incidents.” 
37 U.S. Secret Service, “Preventing School Shootings A Summary of a U.S. Secret Service Safe 
School Initiative Report,” National Institute of Justice Journal 248 (2002).  
38 Ibid. 
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In another report by the USSS, Guide for Preventing and Responding to 
School Violence, it states that since 1992, more than 40 schools have experienced 
multiple victim homicides.39 This information was taken from a security research center 
via case studies. This report is the second edition of the publication from the security 
center and that suggests that it is being updated. 
b. Planning, Risk, and After Action Reports Addressed in 
Government Publications and Theses  
As it is important to include research from multi-disciplines, I looked at a 
journal written for teachers and school administrators, Creating Safe Schools. It reported 
that violent incidents, such as those at Columbine High School, have spurred the 
development of safe school plans and that in some districts those plans are dusty 
documents that administrators can pull out to show that they are creating safe schools in 
their jurisdictions.40  In another source, the Guide for Preventing and Responding to 
School Violence, it specifically addresses preventing and responding to school violence.41 
This is a source on preventing school violence written by individuals that have conducted 
doctoral research corroborate that disregard by school officials for planning and 
providing continuous safety mechanisms also brings forth enormous liability towards the 
school district.42     
An important fact that resurfaced in the literature about the Columbine 
shooting that had also occurred in previous tragedies was the breakdown in 
communication among the responders. In Jane’s Defence Weekly article titled 
“Homeland Security-Containing Risk” states that interagency communications had been 
highlighted as one of the weakest links in emergency management following the response 
to 9/11, the 1999 Columbine High School shootings, and the 1995 Oklahoma City 
39 Ibid.  
40 Bucher and Manning, “Creating Safe Schools,” 55–60. 
41 Kramen, Massey, and Timm, Guide for Preventing. 
42 Ibid. 
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bombing.43 This research on risk correlates 9/11 to Oklahoma City bombings and the 
Columbine shooting, both of which occurred in the U.S. There are some dissimilarities, 
including the fact that the actors were foreign terrorists in 9/11 and the other two 
incidents were home grown Americans.  
The publication “Containing Risk” in Jane’s Defence stated that when 
schools were polled, 95 percent of them reported they had comprehensive plans for crisis 
preparedness and recovery, only to be countered by another national survey of more than 
750 school-based police officers where about half of them said the emergency plans for 
their schools were unsatisfactory.44 The comparison of studies between school 
administrators and law enforcement officers assigned to school campuses show a 
difference of opinion between schools and law enforcement; this is important. Most law 
enforcement officers do not work for the school; they can provide their assessment 
without taking into consideration the politics. Since the survey was distributed throughout 
the U.S., there was nationwide sample of responses. More scrutiny needs to be given to 
the raw data to decipher how many total schools were surveyed in order to have a better 
understanding of the statistic.   
The Report to the President on Issues Raised by the Virginia Tech 
Tragedy states that many states and communities that have adopted emergency 
preparedness and violence prevention plans to address school and community violence, 
but they have the challenge of fully implementing the programs.45 This report provides 
affirms what school the administrators state and counters what the officers feel in the 
“Containing Risk” article. It was a multi-jurisdictional report submitted by three different 
governmental agencies to the president of the United States (POTUS). The heads of the 
agencies signed the memorandum to the president and multiple levels of review were 
performed. The research covered the USA from the east coast to the west coast. It begs 
43 Richard Scott, Tony Skinner, and Bill Sweetman, “Homeland Security—Containing Risk,” Jane’s 
Defence Weekly 44, no. 1 (2009): 22–29. 
44 Ibid.; Schuster, “Preventing, Preparing for Critical Incidents.” 
45 Michael O. Leavitt, Margaret Spellings, and Alberto Gonzales, Report to the President on Issues 
Raised by the Virginia Tech Tragedy (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, 
U.S. Department of Education, and U.S. Department of Justice), 
http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2007/June/vt_report_061307.pdf. 
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the issue as to whether the content was written for a political purpose or is truly the result 
of objective research because this report was written for the president, a very political 
office.   
In another source I reviewed, the U.S. Department of Education newsletter 
Barriers to Collaboration, it states that the key to interagency collaboration is trust and 
developing opportunities to train together, share issues, and to connect with various 
individuals helps bridge differences and dissolve misperceptions.46 This article is 
directed to educators and is informing the educational discipline the need to collaborate. 
In a different view, the thesis by Lieutenant Tracy L. Frazzano of the 
Montclair Police Department in New Jersey focuses on preparedness and pre-planning. 
Her thesis supports that networks built in a time of calmness could lead to benefits of the 
partnership in a time of crisis.47 Preparation and pre-event planning are critical to 
mobilizing resources when they are needed. Frazanno supports the development of 
flexible plans to respond disasters will limit the chaos and confusion at the same time 
limiting casualties since pre-planning identifies potential and realistic dangers.48  
Another document that advocated prevention is Prepared Response: A 
Mitigation Strategy to Prepare School Communities for School Shooters.49 This report 
states that school shootings will never be 100 percent preventable, just like other crime 
cannot be, but that does not mean that school shootings cannot be properly prepared for 
or mitigated by proactive actions taken beforehand.50  
c. Physical Security of Schools and Concerns Addressed in 
Government Publications 
School shootings are a nationwide concern as evidenced in the report to 
Congress, The Safe and Drug Free Schools and Communities Program: Background and 
46 REMS, “Highlights in the Field.” 
47 Tracey L. Frazzano, “Local Jurisdictions and Active Shooters: Building Networks, Building 
Capacities” (master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2010).  
48 Ibid. 
49 Troughton, Prepared Response. 
50 Ibid. 
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Context.51  Reports to Congress, such as this one, are well researched and sources are 
cited, and they often present recent and relevant material. Congressional reports are 
government publications and are written to inform policy makers; however, one issue to 
keep in mind is that the Congress is political. 
Another government publication (for FEMA) is the Primer to Design Safe 
School Projects in Case of Terrorist Attacks and School Shootings, which recommends 
schools to work with law enforcement officials and emergency preparedness departments 
on a strategy for coordination as part of the school emergency plan. The report is detailed 
about incorporating safety features during construction and remodeling to enhance the 
overall physical safety of a school.52   
2. Social Implications Involving School Shootings in Medical Journals 
Medical journals were another source of articles in this research. The study Code 
of Silence: Students’ Perceptions of School Climate and Willingness to Intervene in a 
Peer’s Dangerous Plan was published by the U.S. National Library of Medicine National 
Institutes of Health. In it, the authors found the normative tendency for adolescents to be 
sensitive to others’ impressions.53 For example, they may be hesitant to act out of fear of 
reacting inappropriately or being labeled a snitch or a narc.54  This document shows the 
social implications of what contributes to people not informing law enforcement or 
schools officials about information of others talking about or planning school shootings.  
The Guide for Preventing and Responding to School Violence states that the 
forms of communication media (print, television, radio, computer, and film) can play an 
important role in helping to prevent violence in the schools and the media can help limit 
the harm that results when violence does occur.55 On the other hand, use of media can 
51 Cooper, The Safe and Drug Free Schools. 
52 Science and Technology Directorate, Buildings and Infrastructure Protection. 
53 Amy K. Syvertsen, Constance A. Flanagan, and Michael D. Stout, Code of Silence: Students’ 
Perceptions of School Climate and Willingness to Intervene in a Peer’s Dangerous Plan (Washington, DC: 
U.S. National Library of Medicine National Institutes of Health, 2009). 
54 Ibid. 
55 Kramen, Massey, and Timm, Guide for Preventing. 
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also have drawbacks, such as those exposed to the media will try to mimic the violent act, 
desensitize viewers to the horrors of violence, may increase their likelihood of 
committing it, and exaggerate the magnitude of the real threat. This could result in people 
fearing for their own or their children’s safety in situations where little danger is actually 
present.56 There are conflicting views regarding the media, and it is important to write 
about both sides. 
3. Summary of Literature Review 
The research showed that there are great numbers of governmental publications 
involving the topic of school shootings ranging from physical school security to planning 
for school shootings. Two things that really stood out from the Secret Service documents 
are that the attackers make plans, and they talk about the plans. In response, law 
enforcement and school officials have made plans and have increased physical security at 
the schools. No research uncovered as of yet focused on the issue of information sharing 
between schools and law enforcement regarding students who have engaged in 
aggressive behavior. Furthermore, no research was found to date, regarding analytical 
capabilities of any organization to analyze and then provide that information to schools 
and law enforcement regarding the conduct of students that have displayed aggressive 
actions such as bullying and fighting. 
The following chapters following will be the case studies of the Virginia Tech 
School shooting, Sandy Hook Elementary School shooting, Green Junior High School 
shooting and the Beslan School shootings. The case studies will provide a background, 
describe the mental condition of the shooter(s), explain activities prior to the shooting, 
and look at what, if any, information sharing between schools, law enforcement, 
government, and medical treatment institutions occurred. 
56 Ibid. 
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II. VIRGINIA TECH SHOOTING CASE STUDY 
In this discussion about the Virginia Tech case study, this section will provide 
background information, describe the mental condition of the shooter, explain activities 
prior to the shooting, and look at what, if any, information sharing between schools, law 
enforcement, government, and medical treatment institutions occurred. The shooter at 
Virginia Tech was a current student to whom there was no motive attributed for the 
shooting. At the end of the case study, an analysis will address if there was a breakdown 
in communication between key stakeholders, and if there were missed signals by the 
organizations involved. The majority of this material is taken from the report Mass 
Shootings at Virginia Tech Addendum to the report of the Review Panel.   
A. BACKGROUND 
On April 16, 2007, a senior university student, Seung Hui Cho, murdered 32 
students and injured 17 other students and faculty in two related incidents on the campus 
of Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University (Virginia Tech). Cho started his 
killing spree early in the morning that day when he went to West Ambler Johnston 
(WAJ) residence hall. At approximately 0715 hours, Cho went to the dorm room of 
Virginia Tech student Emily Hilscher and fatally shot her.57  The resident advisor, Ryan 
Clark, who lived next door to Hilscher, went to check on her when he heard the loud 
noises coming from Hilscher’s dorm. When Clark got to Hilsher’s dorm, Cho fatally shot 
Clark as well.58 
Virginia Tech Police Department (VTPD) received calls from other suitemates 
regarding the sounds that had been heard, which had been misinterpreted by those 
reporting the incident. They were requesting assistance as sounds similar to someone 
falling out of bed. VTPD dispatched an officer and an Emergency Medical Services 
(EMS) team to the location, and they arrived approximately five minutes after being 
dispatched. The responding officer asked for further assistance after seeing Hilscher’s 
57 Virginia Tech Review Panel. Mass Shootings at Virginia Tech, 78. 
58 Ibid., 78. 
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dorm and determining that it was a crime scene. The VTPD Chief, Flinchum, asked for 
assistance from the Blacksburg Police Department (BPD) and notified university 
administrators of the officer’s observations.59  The investigation initially focused on 
Hilscher’s boyfriend as a person of interest, as she was with him last the night before. 
The direction of the investigation followed a domestic violence type of investigation. 
Officials discovered that Hilscher’s boyfriend had already left the school grounds and 
excluded the possibility of a murderer running around on campus.60  
Chief Flinchum informed the university president, and once informed, the 
president almost immediately convened the emergency Policy Group to decide how to 
respond, including how and when to notify the university community. Ironically, the 
VTPD is not a member of the Policy Group and does not have the capability to send out 
notifications itself. Rather, the VTPD has to go through an administrator to send out 
emergency messages to the campus community.61  Almost two hours after the initial 
shooting, campus administrators sent out a carefully worded alert to the campus 
community regarding the double homicide; administrators did not want to create panic as 
had occurred when misinformation previously sent out regarding an incident months 
prior where a prison escapee may have possibly made his way on campus.62 
As the morning continued after the double murder, coupled with the delay of 
sending out a mass warning message, students, faculty and staff continued on with their 
routine business for the day. Classes were not cancelled, and the campus was not placed 
on lock down. Virginal Tech could not be truly locked down because the individual 
classrooms do not have locks on their doors; just the entrances to the buildings have locks 
on them.63 
59 Ibid., 78. 
60 Ibid., 79. 
61 Ibid., 80. 
62 Ibid., 81. 
63 Ibid., 83. 
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After the first shooting, Cho went to his dorm and changed out of his blood 
stained clothing.64  He then accessed his campus email, deleted items, and wiped out his 
account. Then, at approximately 0900 hours, Cho was at the Blacksburg post office, 
where he mailed his manifesto to a news agency.65  While at the post office a professor 
recognized Cho, but the professor was unaware of Cho’s actions earlier that morning. 
Shorty after going to the post office, Cho arrived at Norris Hall. He had brought his 
weapons, almost 400 rounds of ammunition, magazines, chains, and a hammer with him. 
Cho chained shut the three main entrances at Norris Hall, which prevented both entry and 
escape. Cho also left a note at one of the chained doors stating that a bomb would go off 
if anyone attempted to remove the chains. A faculty member found the note and took it to 
the Dean of Engineering instead of calling the police department.66  Students found the 
doors chained prior to the shooting, but they did not report it to the police department. 
The students also did not report the chained doors to university. One student actually 
climbed through a window to get into Norris Hall after being unable to get into the 
building because of the chained doors.67   
Cho walked into a classroom and killed the professor and several other students. 
The gunfire noises did not register with students and other faculty as gunfire; rather, 
people thought it was possible construction noise or chemistry experiments. One student 
entered the hallway to investigate the sounds and was shot, which created panic.68  
Students called 911 and, within a minute of the 911 calls, VTPD knew of the Norris Hall 
shootings. VTPD responded and arrived within three minutes. In the meantime, Cho went 
to other rooms and killed professors and students and injuring others.69  The massacre 
lasted approximately 10–12 minutes and within that time period, Cho had killed 25 
students and five faculty members. In addition, Cho had injured 17 others who were shot 
but survived. During his shooting rampage, Cho had expended at least 174 bullets from 
64 Ibid., 85. 
65 Ibid., 86. 
66 Ibid., 89. 
67 Ibid., 90. 
68 Ibid., 90. 
69 Ibid., 91. 
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two semiautomatic guns. The investigation revealed Cho had used his 9mm Glock and 
.22 caliber Walther also. Finally, Cho committed suicide, most likely after hearing the 
sirens of the police response and shots fired by police at the door locks Cho had chained. 
Cho had over 200 live ammunition rounds remaining prior to committing suicide. This 
time, university officials sent out a message that a gunman was loose on the campus 
within five minutes of receiving information from VTPD.70 
B. THE MENTAL CONDITION OF THE SHOOTER 
Cho was born in Seoul, Korea and moved to the United States when he was eight 
years old. His family consisted of his sister and parents. His parents were hard working 
individuals that operated a dry cleaning establishment, working long hours in Virginia.71  
Cho was shy and introverted in his childhood years while in elementary school. Prior to 
entering the seventh grade, schools officials met with Cho’s parents and encouraged 
counseling for Cho. At that time, Cho was diagnosed with selective mutism.72  His 
parents tried to socialize Cho by encouraging him to have activities with his friends, but 
Cho remained to be withdrawn. In 1999, when he was in the eighth grade, Cho’s teachers 
identified suicidal and homicidal ideas in his written schoolwork; Cho was referring to 
the Columbine High School Shootings.73  Due to these concerns, the school staff asked 
Cho’s parents to seek the services of a counselor. At that time, he underwent a psychiatric 
evaluation, which necessitated anti-depression medication. Cho took the medication for a 
year and responded well to the treatment. Due to Cho’s positive response to the 
medication, he was taken off the medication after his year of treatment.74   
Then, Cho entered high school and at that time he enrolled in an Individual 
Educational Program to deal with his shyness and lack of responsiveness in classroom 
settings. He continued with counseling services and showed progress with adjusting to 
the school environment. After he graduated high school, and he was accepted to Virginia 
70 Ibid., 92. 
71 Ibid., 22. 
72 Ibid., 22. 
73 Ibid., 22. 
74 Ibid., 35. 
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Tech. As he attended Virginia Tech, Cho had issues early on with his roommates over 
neatness, causing Cho to change dorms. After that, he moved in with another student, and 
this time he complains of mites in the room. Cho saw a doctor at the time, who diagnosed 
him with acne and prescribed medication.75  According to Cho’s sister, he had developed 
a passion for writing and submitted an idea for a book; the publisher rejected Cho’s 
proposal. Then, Cho had a demeanor change and lost interest in writing. As he started his 
junior year, he attended college parties with his roommates. At one party, Cho was seen 
stabbing the carpet with a knife.76  His poetry professor recognized violence in Cho’s 
writing and also confronted him about taking pictures of other students by holding a 
camera under his desk. Cho’s professor notified the department chair in an effort to create 
a documentation trail to be used against Cho for removal from the class at a later time.77 
Cho was eventually removed from that class and given individual tutoring from 
another professor. Counseling was recommended for him at the time but Cho refused to 
accept it. Cho’s refusal prompted the notifications to Division of Student Affairs, the 
Cook Counseling Center, the Schiffert Health Center, the Virginia Tech Police 
Department, and the College of Liberal Arts and Human Sciences.78 Cho’s problems 
were discussed with the university’s Care Team, which reviews cases of students with 
problems. In November 2004, a female student reported Cho to VTPD for harassing her 
through the Internet, phone, and in person. That case got handled through the school’s 
disciplinary system.79  Other females reported similar incidents about Cho thru 
December 2004. VTPD contacted Cho and advised him to have no further contact with 
those students who had filed complaints against him, prompting Cho to send a text to his 
roommate at the time that he might as well kill himself.80  That comment was reported to 
VTPD, who followed up with procedure and took him to a psychological evaluation 
75 Ibid., 22. 
76 Ibid., 23. 
77 Ibid., 23. 
78 Ibid., 43. 
79 Ibid., 23. 
80 Ibid., 24. 
 21 
                                                 
center. The evaluations ultimately led to Cho being detained for being a danger to himself 
and others.81 
The psychologist who evaluated Cho determined that he did not present a danger 
to himself. In addition, another psychologist also determined Cho was not a danger to 
himself or others without gathering collateral information.82  After that, Cho was then 
referred to a counseling center, which was the third visit for Cho in 15 days. No 
medications were prescribed by either of the psychologists that saw Cho, and the doctors 
made findings that Cho was normal and without indication of psychosis, delusions, and 
suicidal or homicidal ideation.83 
In April 2006, Cho’s technical writing professor counseled him for shortcomings 
and Cho followed the professor to his office and raised his voice at the professor. This 
incident went unreported by the professor. Also in the spring of 2006, Cho wrote a paper 
for his creative writing class concerning a young man who hated the students at his 
school and planned to kill them and himself.84  These writings were later discovered to 
have parallels to the day he committed the shootings. Another professor reported Cho to 
the dean and the dean found no mental health issues or police reports involving Cho. 
Counseling was again recommended but Cho declined.85   
C. ACTIVITY PRIOR TO THE SHOOTING 
In February and March of 2007, Cho purchased the handguns, additional 
magazines, chains, and ammunition. In April, he rented a hotel room and videotaped 
himself for his manifesto.86  On April 14, and Asian male wearing a hooded sweatshirt 
was seen at Norris Hall by a faculty member. Students had reported that doors were 
chained at the time to the faculty member, who did not tell the police until after the 
81 Ibid., 24. 
82 Ibid., 24. 
83 Ibid., 25. 
84 Ibid., 25. 
85 Ibid., 25. 
86 Ibid., 26. 
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shooting incident of what they had observed and learned. The same day, he bought more 
ammunition.87  On April 15, Cho called his family as a matter of routine with no unusual 
or apparent content causing the family any concern.88  On April 16, 2007, Cho was seen 
at his computer at 0500 hours by his roommate and then seen brushing his teeth and 
applying acne medicine. Less than 2 hours later, he committed the double homicide and 
then murdered the other students and professors at Norris Hall.89 
D. INFORMATION SHARING BETWEEN SCHOOLS, LAW 
ENFORCEMENT, GOVERNMENT, AND MEDICAL TREATMENT 
INSTITUTIONS 
Information sharing enables stakeholders to be in the know and then at the very 
least, have on option to evaluate and engage. There were signals that is were missed that 
led to grave consequences. For example, Virginia Tech has a Care Team to intervene 
with students that are experiencing issues. The Care Team is multi-disciplinary and is 
comprised of different functions. The VTPD is only second tier in the process, creating a 
situation where important information known to VTPD does not interchange at early 
levels with the Care Team.90 
The lack of information sharing among public safety, administrative, academic 
units at Virginia Tech and the students who had raised several concerns about Cho’s 
conduct contributed to the failure to see the big picture of the path he was heading 
towards. Professors had information regarding Cho’s conduct in class and his written 
work that included murderous and suicidal thoughts. Additionally, students had 
information regarding Cho stalking and intimidating them. Furthermore, the police had 
information regarding warnings given and his commitment to a psychiatric facility for 
evaluation as a danger to himself and others. Moreover, faculty and students observed 
suspicious activity, such as chained doors, and they failed to take any timely action, 
although it could not be attributed to Cho at the time. Finally, school administrators had 
87 Ibid., 26. 
88 Ibid. 
89 Ibid. 
90 Ibid., 52. 
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information from faculty regarding Cho’s continuous and concerning aberrant and 
dangerous demeanor in class.91 
Medical facilities that provide treatment and psychological services rely on Health 
Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) for guidance on issues related to 
patient information. HIPAA provides federal protections for individually identifiable 
health information held by covered entities and their business associates and gives 
patients an array of rights with respect to that information. At the same time, HIPPA is 
balanced so that it permits the disclosure of health information needed for patient care 
and other important purposes such as public safety emergencies.92  School districts rely 
on the Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act (FERPA) for guidance related to 
education records. This federal law protects the privacy of student education records and 
applies to all schools that receive funds under an applicable program of the U.S. 
Department of Education.93  Just like HIPAA, FERPA allows for the disclosure of 
records to appropriate officials when health and safety emergencies exist.94  
Medical treatment facilities and schools heavily cite the laws as reasons for non-
disclosure of information to law enforcement without taking into account permissible 
situations. The standard practice has been non-disclosure of information, as it is easier to 
say no to sharing information than find a solution to share information. Not disclosing 
information to law enforcement when it should be disclosed hinders follow up 
investigations. Laws are complex and often misunderstood. Privacy laws can block 
attempts to share information and cause information holders to default to the 
nondisclosure even when laws permit disclosure. Sometimes it is because of ignorance of 
the law, and other times it is done intentionally because it serves the purposes of the 
individual or organization to hide behind the privacy law. In this instance, permitted 
exceptions are medical file information necessary for the care of a patient, and 
91 Ibid., 53. 
92 U.S. Department of Health & Human Services, “Understanding Health Information Privacy,” 
accessed October 28, 2013, http://www.hhs.gov/ocr/privacy/hipaa/understanding/.  
93 U.S. Department of Education, “Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act (FERPA),” accessed 
October 28, 2013, http://www.ed.gov/policy/gen/guid/fpco/ferpa/index.html.  
94 Ibid. 
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information concerning a patient who may present a serious threat to public health or 
safety. To complicate matters, those individuals that had personal information regarding 
Cho’s conduct were not present at his commitment hearings with the court, and the 
information did not make it to the evaluators that were conducting his psychiatric 
evaluation.95 
Certain law enforcement records are subject to disclosure and VTPD did not share 
the information with the school. The court commitment hearings are public; however, the 
medical records that are presented at the proceedings are confidential. VTPD could have 
shared the information about the hearing with school officials.96 
E. ANALYSIS 
The Virginia Tech shooting several stakeholders that were involved with Cho, and 
they all had valuable information that should have been shared with one another.   
1. The school staff recognized murderous and suicidal ideals in Cho’s 
writings,  
2. The professors reported their concerns to the administration,  
3. The police received reports about Cho’s stalking and intimidation of other 
students,  
4. The police were involved in placing Cho on a psychiatric evaluation, and 
Cho had been seen by counselors on campus.   
5. The school had a multi-tier Care Team that did not include the police 
department that was not included on the primary tier.   
All these things combined were a failure of communication and collaboration 
between everybody that was involved. One component should not receive more or less 
blame than any other component; all components needed to work together. There seemed 
to be a lack of urgency by those involved with dealing with Cho. In addition, the 
psychological evaluators and school administrators could not make proper evaluations 
due to incomplete information. 
95 Virginia Tech Review Panel, Mass Shootings at Virginia Tech. 
96 Ibid. 
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Medical records are guarded by HIPAA; however, there are exceptions within the 
law to allow for release of records to protect the subject and other individuals when the 
patient poses a threat to himself or others. What is needed is a change in organizational 
culture, both from administrators who possess the HIPAA information and the recipients 
of the HIPAA information. Top administrators need to engage in a culture of supporting 
the exchange of information as allowed by the law. There does not need to be a major 
amendment to the HIPAA law as the law is already clear that the information may be 
shared under certain circumstances. What is needed is for the law to be reinforced by 
those affected by the law. The possessors of the information need to train their staff, 
retrain their staff, and have continuous positive reinforcement for sharing information. 
The norm should not be withholding information; rather it should be sharing information 
allowed by law. 
The potential recipients of HIPAA information need not be silent either. Police 
department administrators need to ensure that their staff receive HIPAA PPA law training 
and are fully aware of the restrictions intended by the law as well as the exceptions 
available within the law for the protection of the individual and the community. 
Furthermore, law enforcement officers should be asking for HIPAA information from 
medical facilities involving subjects that have been treated there where the law allows for 
the exceptions. 
The school campuses around the United States need to institute a policy regarding 
the reporting of criminal activity, threats, and other situations where safety is a concern. 
There were several instances of this in the Virginia Tech case. For example, chained 
doors went unreported by students and faculty alike, Cho’s conduct in some of the classes 
went unreported by professors, and the school did not have a mandatory reporting policy 
regarding violence. Mandatory reporting is not the cure all solution, but what mandatory 
reporting does do is distribute information among stakeholders information they should 
know and have access to.   
For example, both the Department of Children and Family Services and the Adult 
Protective Services cross report with California law enforcement agencies regarding 
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suspected abuse situations.97  With cross reporting, information that people need to know 
needs to be brought to their attention so that those responsible for taking action on a 
particular incident can do so. There will be situations where people that were responsible 
for acting after receiving information do not act; however, that is not a breakdown of the 
cross reporting system, but either an intentional or unintentional misinterpretation of the 
information being cross-reported.   
The next chapter will be the case study on the Sandy Hook Elementary School 
shooting, which occurred in Newton, Connecticut. The case study will show parallels to 
the Virginia Tech shooting in that the perpetrator displayed warning signs prior to the 
shooting that went unreported by school officials to the police department. 
 
97 Office of Child Abuse Prevention, State of California Department of Social Services, “Child Abuse 
Reporting and You,” Publication 129 (Sacramento, CA: State of California Department of Social Services 
Office of Child Abuse Prevention, 2006).  
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III. SANDY HOOK ELEMENTARY SCHOOL SHOOTING 
This chapter on Sandy Hook Elementary School shooting case study will provide 
background, describe the mental condition of the shooter, explain activities prior to the 
shooting, and look at what, if any, information sharing between schools, law 
enforcement, government, and medical treatment institutions occurred. In this case, the 
shooter was a previous student in which there was no motive discovered for the shooting. 
At the end of the case study, there will be an analysis to address whether there was a 
breakdown in communication between key stakeholders and if there were signals that 
were missed by the organizations involved. 
A. BACKGROUND 
On December 14, 2012, at approximately 0935hours, the Newtown, Connecticut 
Police Department received several 911 calls regarding an active shooter at the Sandy 
Hook Elementary School. Adam Lanza, a former student of the school, had driven his 
mother’s vehicle and parked it at the fire lane in front of the school. Lanza was dressed in 
military apparel and had armed himself with several semi-automatic handguns and a 
military style assault rifle. Once he entered the school, he shot and killed students and 
adults, ultimately turned the gun on himself and committed suicide.98 
Adam Lanza took hundreds of bullets with him when he entered the school. He 
shot the children and adults at the school with a Bushmaster .223 semiautomatic rifle, but 
he also had with him a Sig Sauer semi-automatic handgun and Glock semi-automatic 
handgun. Lanza had with him several 30 round high-capacity magazines for the 
Bushmaster and several magazines for both handguns, with hundreds of rounds. A search 
of the car Lanza drove to the school and left parked outside the school yielded a shotgun. 
Eventually, Lanza shot himself in the head with a Glock 10-millimeter handgun.99 
98 Connecticut Superior Court, Police Report Number CFS12–00704559. 
99 Tina Susman, Brian Bennett, and Joe Mozingo, “Connecticut Shooting: Obama Vows To Do All He 
Can; Nation Not Doing Enough To Protect Kids, He Says,” Los Angeles Times, December 17, 2012, Los 
Angeles edition, A.1. 
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Adam Lanza killed 20 children and six adults at Sandy Hook Elementary school 
with a Bushmaster .223 caliber, model XM15 rifle. The Bushmaster was loaded with a 
30-round capacity magazine; 14 rounds were still in the magazine when police recovered 
the rifle. In addition, there was one round in the chamber of the firearm.100 
B. THE MENTAL CONDITION OF THE SHOOTER 
Adam Lanza had drawn attention to himself during his high school years. While 
he was a freshman at Newtown High School, staff members referred him to a high-school 
psychologist. Teachers, counselors, and security officers helped monitor Lanza as he was 
described as a skinny, very socially awkward teen. At that time, the school’s fear was not 
that Lanza was dangerous, but the opposite, according Richard J. Novia, the director of 
security at Newtown School District in 2007.101  School officials thought Lanza did not 
pose a threat to anyone else, rather the school district was worried about Lanza being a 
victim or that he would hurt himself. The Newtown School District had assigned a 
permanent psychologist to Lanza in his freshman year in 2007 and had flagged him to the 
school’s security chief when he was still in middle school.   
Lanza was described by school officials as very withdrawn, meek, and in need of 
watching. Novia said it was not unusual for school officials to meet about troubled 
students, but Lanza’s problems were recognized as more severe than most, and so Lanza 
was to be monitored in high school by the security staff that worked there.102 It is 
possible that Adam Lanza was taking an antipsychotic medication with side effects such 
100 “Danbury State’s Attorney Releases Information on December 14, 2012, Incident at Sandy Hook 
Elementary School,” State of Connecticut Department of Emergency Services & Public Protection, news 
release, March 28, 2013, http://www.ct.gov/despp/cwp/view.asp?Q=521730. 
101 Tamara Audi, Anton Troianovski, and Josh Dawsey, “Connecticut School Shooting: Shooter’s 




                                                 
as being withdrawn.103  It is known that Lanza had Asperger’s, a form of Autism, but 
experts say that the condition did not lead to the shooting.104 
C. ACTIVITY PRIOR TO THE SHOOTING 
The day prior to the shooting (December 13, 2012), 20 year old Lanza105 had 
gone to Sandy Hook Elementary School and gotten in an altercation with four school 
officials, three of whom would be murdered by Lanza on the day of the shooting.106  A 
family friend of Lanza’s mother, Marvin LaFontaine, believed that the reason Lanza went 
to the school was because he had been harboring resentment towards the school due to 
having been bullied when he was a student there.107 Law enforcement officers from the 
Connecticut State Police went to Adam Lanza’s residence and found his mother, Nancy 
Lanza, deceased inside. She had a gunshot to her head and there was rifle near her body. 
The investigation concluded that Adam Lanza had shot his mother prior to the shooting at 
the elementary school.108 
D. INFORMATION SHARING BETWEEN SCHOOLS, LAW 
ENFORCEMENT, GOVERNMENT, AND MEDICAL TREATMENT 
INSTITUTIONS 
Adam Lanza was not on the radar for law enforcement as he was growing up. He 
was, however, dealing with school psychologists within the school district. Lanza was 
reported to the school security staff so they could pay more attention to him. This shows 
103 Amanda Paulson, “Sandy Hook Shooting’s Glare Illumines Cracks in Mental Health Care,” The 
Christian Science Monitor, December 18, 2012, 10. 
104 Jenny Marder and Jason Kane, “Why Diagnosing Adam Lanza is a Problem,” The Rundown, 
December 18, 2012, PBS, accessed July 18, 2013, http://www.pbs.org/newshour/rundown/2012/12/why-
diagnosing-adam-lanza-is-a-problem.html.  
105 “Adam Lanza’s Father, Peter Lanza, Meets with Newtown Victim’s Parents,” Huffington Post, 
March 21, 2013, accessed October 28, 2013, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/03/21/adam-lanzas-
father-newtown-family-meeting_n_2923295.html. 
106 Julia Terruso “Reports: Gunman had Altercation at School Days before Shooting,” New Jersey 
News, December 15, 2012, accessed July 18, 2013, 
http://www.nj.com/news/index.ssf/2012/12/gunman_may_have_had_altercatio.html. 
107 Matthew Lysiak and Rich Schapiro, EXCLUSIVE: Adam Lanza’s Murder Spree At Sandy Hook 
May Have Been Act Of Revenge, New York Daily News, April 7, 2013, accessed October, 28, 2013, 
http://www.nj.com/news/index.ssf/2012/12/gunman_may_have_had_altercatio.html. 
108 Connecticut Superior Court, Police Report Number CFS12–00704559. 
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collaboration internally, and for the time that Lanza was on campus, the collaboration 
caused school employees to be more attentive to him. The day before the shooting, 
Lanza’s disturbance at the school did not get reported to law enforcement. Although 
Lanza was not a current student at the school, he was a previous student with the 
knowledge of the staff and layout of the school. He had more knowledge than an average 
person who had not attended the school.   
E. ANALYSIS 
The Sandy Hook shooting had signs of violence that went unreported. Adam 
Lanza had caused a disturbance at the school the day prior to the shooting and the police 
were never notified of the incident. Reporting aggression by school staff to the police 
would have elicited a response by the police department with jurisdiction at the school. 
With a police response, at least a preliminary investigation as to what occurred and who 
did what is initiated. For example, Adam Lanza could have been contacted by the officer 
and questioned about his conduct. The officer would have identified Lanza and evaluated 
him as a candidate for a psychological evaluation by professionals. In addition, Lanza 
could have been asked regarding weapons, intentions, and whatever else the investigation 
might have uncovered.   
Sometimes people act out in a need for attention and having contact with 
individuals that are in that state provides the opportunity to ask questions and take 
actions. This is not to say that the physical security component needs to be minimized, 
just that prevention efforts should precede physical security at schools. Even with 
physical security, shooters can penetrate schools should they have their minds set on it as 
Lanza did when he shot thought the school’s gate. The focus needs to be on sharing of 
information to prevent the shootings from occurring in the first place. 
The case study described above clearly articulates both a reason and a need to 
inform public safety officials. This is also supported by The National Strategy for 
Information Sharing and Safeguarding, which aims to achieve the proper balance between 
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sharing information with homeland security professional in order to keep our schools safe 
from those who would do us harm.109 
The next chapter will be a case study on the E. O. Green Junior High School 
shooting that occurred in Oxnard, California. The parallels this shooting has with both 
Virginia Tech and Sandy Hook Elementary shootings are that the shooter was a student 
and that there were tensions with the shooter that other students and teachers noticed 







109 White House, National Strategy for Information Sharing and Safeguarding (Washington, DC: 
White House, 2012). 
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IV. GREEN JUNIOR HIGH SCHOOL SHOOTING 
The Green Junior High School shooting case study will provide a background, 
describe the mental condition of the shooter, explain activities prior to the shooting, and 
look at what, if any, information sharing between schools, law enforcement, government, 
and medical treatment institutions occurred. The shooter was a current student in which 
the motive for the shooting was because another homosexual student’s advances angered 
the shooter. At the end of the case study, an analysis will address if there was a 
breakdown in communication between key stakeholders and if there were missed signals 
by the organizations involved. 
A. BACKGROUND 
Larry King was a 15-year-old high school student at E. O. Green High School in 
Oxnard, California. He was an eighth grader at the school and had started to be open with 
his homosexuality, including incorporating feminine items in his clothing at school. In 
the weeks prior to the shooting, King had been wearing women’s high heel shoes and 
makeup. His outward homosexual expression caused the other male students at the school 
to taunt King with homosexual slurs. The other students also tripped King or avoided 
contact with him.110 Brandon McInerney was another 14-year-old student who attended 
Green Junior High School with King and fatally shot him.111 
On February 12, 2008, McInerney went to school in the morning. He returned 
home and retrieved his father’s loaded .22-caliber revolver. McInerney concealed the 
firearm in a towel and stuffed it in his backpack and returned to school. Once at school he 
retrieved and stuffed the towel-wrapped gun in his pants. McInerney returned to class and 
took his seat directly behind King. After McInerney heard King tell a girl he had changed 
110 Catherine Saillant, “CALIFORNIA: Tension High before Slaying: Friend Says Teen Was 
‘Embarrassed and Mad’ After Gay Boy Teased Him in School,” Los Angeles Times, July 8, 2011, Los 
Angeles edition, AA.3. 
111 Catherine Saillant, “1,000 Gather in Tribute to Slain Oxnard Teen: A March Organized by 
Students Focuses on Tolerance in the Wake of the Fatal Shooting of an Openly Gay Boy,” Los Angeles 
Times, February 17, 2008, Los Angeles edition, B.3. 
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his name to Leticia, McInerney took out the gun and shot King twice in the head and 
fled.112   
Immediately after the shooting, McInerney was apprehended by Oxnard Police 
officers. At the time of the arrest, McInerney apologized to the officers for shooting 
King. McInerney had previously told other students that he was going to kill King, and 
solicited other students to jump and stab King. None of the students McInerney solicited 
reported the threats because they did not take him seriously. After the shooting, 
investigators found additional weapons in an unlocked closet in McInerney’s home. In a 
bedroom McInerney shared with his brother, police found swastikas, ammunition, and an 
instructional DVD on “Shooting in Realistic Environments.”113 
Ventura County prosecutors filed murder charges as well as a hate crime 
allegation against McInerney for killing King. Ventura County Superior Court Judge Ken 
Riley heard testimony about McInerney telling other students his intent to kill King. 
Judge Riley found McInerney fit to be tried as an adult for his actions.114  McInerney was 
tried, however the jury was unable to reach unanimous verdict for the crime of murder. 
Instead, the jury was deadlocked seven to five in favor of voluntary manslaughter. The 
jury unanimously rejected that the killing was a hate crime filled with white supremacist 
beliefs. As a result, the trial was declared a mistrial.115  Instead of trying McInerney a 
second time, prosecutors were able to plea bargain for a 21-year sentence for second  
 
112 Steve Chawkins, “Psychologist Says Teen ‘Snapped’ and Fatally Shot Student: He Testifies That 
Brandon McInerney Was in a Dissociative State When He Killed Classmate Larry King,” Los Angeles 
Times, August 16, 2011, Los Angeles edition, AA.1. 
113 Catherine Saillant, “Officers Say Teen Slaying Suspect Apologized: Oxnard Police Say Brandon 
McInerney, Accused of Killing Larry King, Told Them, ‘I’m Sorry, I Did It,’” Los Angeles Times, July 21, 
2009, Los Angeles edition, A.4. 
114 Steve Chawkins, “Teen to Stand Trial in Gay Boy’s Killing: Brandon McInerney, 15, Could Face 
53 Years to Life if Convicted in 2008 Shooting Death at an Oxnard School,” Los Angeles Times, July 23, 
2009, Los Angeles edition, A.4. 
115 Catherine Saillant, “Mistrial in Killing of Gay Student: Jurors Deadlocked 7 to 5 in Favor of 
Voluntary Manslaughter in the Emotional Proceeding,” Los Angeles Times, September 2, 2011, Los 
Angeles edition, AA.1. 
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degree murder and voluntary manslaughter in exchange for a guilty plea.116 The Ventura 
County District Attorney’s Office stated that McInerney would spend 21 years in prison 
for his crime.117 
B. ACTIVITY PRIOR TO THE SHOOTING 
Dawn Boldrin, the teacher whose classroom McInerney shot King in, described 
McInerney as one that had his own family troubles and had recently let his grades slip. 
Boldrin described McInerney as smart, but an individual that would not do much in class; 
he did not even bring a pencil or paper.118 In a statement of facts to the court prior to trial 
authored by Deputy District Attorney Maeve Fox, she described that McInerney solicited 
other students to beat King.119 
During the court testimony, Martha Romero, a science teacher at the school 
testified that she had seen an altercation between McInerney and King outside her 
classroom the day before the shooting. Romero said two or three students were 
restraining McInerney, who appeared agitated. Romero later found out that King had told 
McInerney “I love you, baby!” as the two had passed each other in a corridor. Additional 
testimony at trial brought forth information that later that day after the struggle, and 
McInerney told a friend he was going to bring a gun to school the following day.120   
One of McInerney’s friends, who was identified by his first name and initial of his 
last name because he was a minor, Keith L., described McInerney’s demeanor concerning 
the altercation in the corridor as embarrassed and angry. McInerney told Keith L that he 
was going to bring a gun to school the next day, but Keith L. did not give any credence to 
116 Catherine Saillant, “Gay Teen’s Killer Takes 21-Year Deal: The Youth Avoids a Retrial by 
Pleading Guilty to Shooting His Classmate in 2008,” Los Angeles Times, November 22, 2011, Los Angeles 
edition, AA.1. 
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the statement and described it as a friend blowing off steam.121 Another minor female 
student identified by her first name and initial of her last name, Stormy S., also provided 
testimony of her observations of incidents between McInerney and King prior to the 
shooting. Stormy S. was a student in a science class with both King and McInerney. She 
had witnessed them calling each other names on several previous occasions. On the day 
before the shooting, King and McInerney were at odds, clashing again. Stormy S. 
described that when King got up to get a drink of water, McInerney told other students at 
his table that he was going to do something violent to King.122 
Prosecutors presented evidence that McInerney would associate with neo-Nazis 
and kept a notebook containing Nazi symbols and regalia. Dan Swanson, a Simi Valley 
police detective and specialist in neo-Nazi gangs, provided expert testimony that white 
supremacists can hide their true feelings and beliefs, to rebut the picture painted by the 
defense that McInerney had Black and Latino friends. A search of McInerney’s bedroom 
and backpack yielded seven of Hitler’s speeches and a book about the SS troopers who 
had been a part of Hitler’s youth. Detective Swanson also provided testimony that 
McInerney’s family was friendly with a white supremacist in the Oxnard area. That same 
white supremacist had allowed McInerney and his girlfriend to sleep in his apartment one 
or two nights prior to the fatal shooting. On the other hand, the defense painted a picture 
that McInerney as breaking as a result of sexual insults from King.123 
C. THE MENTAL CONDITION OF THE SHOOTER 
Brandon McInerney had been pressured to do better in school and had a 
methamphetamine addict as a father. He had previously made comments in a sexual 
education class that he would kill any man that would try to touch him. King had asked 
McInerney to be his valentine on two different occasions in front of other students, which 
had upset McInerney. King had engaged in conversation with McInerney asking him, 
121 Ibid. 
122 Ibid. 
123 Steve Chawkins, “California: Neo-Nazi Ideas Blamed in Gay Teen’s Slaying; Attorneys for an 
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“What’s up baby?”124  During trial, McInerney’s defense expert, Psychologist Douglass 
Hoagland, testified that McInerney was in a dissociative state, only to be countered by the 
prosecutor, Maeve Fox, who provided testimony from other students that McInerney had 
told the other students of his intent to kill King.125  During the preliminary hearing, 
McInerney’s defense said that McInerney had been sexually abused as a child and that he 
felt threatened by King.126 
During the preliminary hearing, Simi Valley Police Detective Dan Swanson, an 
expert on white supremacists, testified about an Oxnard man who allegedly was 
McInerney’s neo-Nazi mentor. McInerney had demonstrated his interest in Nazi symbols, 
such as swastika-riddled drawings, which were found in his possession during the course 
of the investigation.127  McInerney’s defense attorney, Robyn Bramson, depicted 
McInerney as an individual that came from a violent home and who decided to end his 
misery from sexual advances from King in a way that made sense to McInerney, by using 
a gun. Bramson said McInerney shot King in the heat of passion caused by the intense 
emotional state between him and the victim at school.128  McInerney’s defense attorneys 
portrayed him as coming from a dysfunctional and violent home and that McInerney had 
reached an emotional breaking point because of King’s advances.129 
D. INFORMATION SHARING BETWEEN SCHOOLS, LAW 
ENFORCEMENT, GOVERNMENT, AND MEDICAL TREATMENT 
INSTITUTIONS 
Larry King’s attire at school had caused division at the school. There were 
students and faculty at E. O. Green Junior High that were upset with King’s feminine 
attire. One substitute teacher refused to allow King in class when he was dressed in 
124 Chawkins, “Psychologist Says Teen ‘Snapped,’” AA.1. 
125 Ibid. 
126 Chawkins, “Teen To Stand Trial,” A.4. 
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feminine attire. The school’s Assistant Principal, Joy Epstein, consulted others in the 
school district and was informed that as long as King was wearing the school uniform 
and it was not disruptive or unsafe, he could accessorize his uniform in a manner he 
chooses. Epstein ensured that King was allowed to attend class. Another teacher, Dawn 
Boldrin, gave King makeup tips and gave him a prom dress, without getting permission 
from King’s foster care guardian prior to doing so.130 
School administrators had issues memos to the teachers regarding King, advising 
them to give King his space but to report any safety issues. During trial, teachers testified 
that when they reported growing tensions between King and several others boys, school 
administrators shunned the teachers. Two months prior to the shooting, King had been 
taken out of his home by authorities because of problems he was having at home. Four 
days prior to the shooting, King’s mother, Dawn King, had approached school officials to 
ask for their assistance in toning down King’s behavior. Dawn King was told by the 
school administrators that Larry King’s civil rights allowed him to express his sexual 
identity, yet Dawn King had an instinct that something serious would happen to King for 
doing so.131 A teacher filed a formal grievance to administrators accusing administrators 
of brushing off complaints by other boys that Larry King was sexually harassing them. 
School administrators sent out an email to the staff stating that Larry King had the 
right to express his sexuality by wearing makeup on campus. Teachers were advised to 
teach tolerance to their students because of the issues surrounding King. An assistant 
principal testified that she warned Larry King that his clothing choice might make things 
difficult for King, but told him, “More power to you if you can get through it.”132  The 
teacher who had heard the concerns from boys who said they wanted to beat Larry King 
up tried to present their threats to her bosses but said she had a door slammed in her face 
130 Catherine Saillant, “California: Slain Teen’s Clothing Focus of Testimony; Larry King Was 
Permitted to Wear Women’s Accessories, School Official Says,” Los Angeles Times, July 12, 2011, Los 
Angeles edition, AA.3. 
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when she went to an administrator’s office.133 Teachers also testified in court that they 
felt powerless to defuse the growing tensions between McInerney and King because the 
they felt they could not intervene, based on a memo administrators sent out stating that 
King was to be left alone.134  Dawn King had approached school administrators to ask 
them to intervene and stop her son’s inclination to act out for attention but she was turned 
down.135 
The school’s decision not to intervene became an important theme during the trial 
and jurors cited it as one of several reasons they were unable to convict McInerney of the 
first-degree murder charge.136 Regardless, school administrators said they would respond 
the same way if it were to happen again.137  Leaders of the Hueneme Elementary School 
District, which operates E. O. Green and 10 other schools, stated they had no plans to 
make policy changes because of the shooting.138 
Oxnard Police Chief, John Crombach, stated that after the shooting several 
students told police they heard comments, statements and threats that were made but that 
they did not take the communication seriously. Chief Crombach said there was no 
evidence that the communication was reported to school officials.139 
Deputy Public Defender William Quest blamed the school for not aggressively 
intervening to dissipate the tensions that were brewing between King and McInerney. 
Quest felt that the school administration downplayed the tensions in favor of allowing 
133 Sandy Banks, “Lessons from a Boy’s Killing; Despite Mistrial, This Much We Know: Young 
Teens Need Guidance,” Los Angeles Times, September 6, 2011, Los Angeles edition, A.2. 
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King to express his sexuality.140  Quest also said that verbal confrontations between 
several male student and King over King’s self-proclaimed homosexuality had been 
rising over time. The confrontations were to the point that teachers were repulsed by 
school administrators’ failure to take action regarding the situation.141  Several teachers 
took the stand in court and testified that they reported incidents involving King to 
administrators. Assistant Principal Joy Epstein was criticized for giving more attention in 
protecting King’s civil rights than in acknowledging that King’s dress and behavior were 
causing problems. Epstein testified for the prosecution and denied that anyone on the 
campus relayed concerns about King’s safety before the shooting.142  However, School 
Superintendent Jerry Dannenberg strongly disagreed that the allegations that the school 
administrators did not know how to handle the situation. Dannenberg said that school 
officials definitely were aware of what was going on with King and McInterney, and they 
were dealing with the situation appropriately.143 
E. ANALYSIS 
Like other shootings, the Green Junior High Shooting also had indications of 
violence. The other students were aware of threats of future violence made by McInerney 
about King. In addition, the teachers had witnessed confrontations between McInerney 
and King. Furthermore, the staff had reported tensions between King and other students. 
Unfortunately, the school did not have a mandatory violence reporting policy, and the 
students that were aware of the threats, minimized them internally. Additionally, law 
enforcement was not aware of the threats and the confrontations on school campus. 
Anytime there are tensions among groups on a campus, a law enforcement presence on 
campus enables observation and interaction.   
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It seems from the court testimony that the administrators knew about the tensions 
that were brewing, yet did not act upon them. Confrontations start out with tensions, and 
when tensions are not quelled, they can lead to increasing levels of violence if there is no 
intervention. The school district is not forward thinking at all as testimony from one of 
their top officials indicated they would not make any policy changes on how the school 
handled the situation.144  There are necessary policy changes, such as reporting 
disturbances and confrontational incidents to law enforcement, asking law enforcement to 
have a presence on the school campuses, and bringing in counselors to address issues 
regarding tensions between groups.   
There is a national-level working group of law enforcement officials that 
recognize that overcoming the barriers that impede information and intelligence sharing 
is a continuous endeavor that will require a firm commitment by all stakeholders. Had 
comprehensive information sharing strategies as affirmed in the National Criminal 
Intelligence Sharing Plan been implemented in the school system, it may have prevented 
a shooting of this sort.145  Reporting the confrontations that occurred between McInerney 
to law enforcement could have led to the officers inquiring further, about McInerney, 
weapons, threats, intentions, and thoughts. Later in the trial, a police detective testified 
that McInerney has ties with white supremacist individuals, and white supremacists ideals 
are those that oppose homosexuality. While reporting incidents may not stop all school 
shooting violence, it at least gives an opportunity for school officials and law 
enforcement to collaborate in an effort to stop incidents “left of boom.”146   
The following chapter is a case study on the Beslan School shooting that occurred 
in Odessa, Russia. It is different in a sense that it was a large group of terrorists attacking 
the school; however, some of the terrorists were former students at the school. Of great  
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significance in this case study is the fact that the Russian intelligence community had 
very strong signals that an attack against a school was going to occur, yet the information 
was not assertively distributed to the community. 
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V. BESLAN SCHOOL SHOOTING 
The Beslan School shooting case study will provide a background, describe the 
mental condition of the shooter, explain activities prior to the shooting, and look at what, 
if any, information sharing between schools, law enforcement, government, and medical 
treatment institutions occurred. This case study differs from the previous case studies in 
two ways. First, it happened outside the United States. Second, it was committed by a 
group of terrorists trying to bring about political change. Most of the information for this 
case study came from publication Anatomy of a Terrorist Attack: Terror at Beslan: A 
Chronicle of On-Going Tragedy and a Government’s Failed Response.147 At the end of 
the case study, there will be an analysis to address whether there was a breakdown in 
communication between key stakeholders and if there were missed signals by the 
organizations involved.  
A. BACKGROUND 
On September 1, 2004, upwards of 50 Chechen terrorists invaded a school 
compound in Beslan, Russia. This was the first day of the school year, and in this area, it 
is a tradition that parents accompany their children to school and meet and greet the 
teachers with gifts. The school was a compound that housed kindergarten thru the 
eleventh grade.148  The terrorist group was comprised of almost all men, with the 
exception of two women. The ethnic compositions of the terrorists were mostly Arabs, 
Chechens, and Russians. The terrorists were armed with automatic weapons, rifles, 
grenades, suicide vests, gas masks, and night vision goggles. They herded approximately 
1200 students and parents into the gym, taking them hostage. As the siege was underway, 
there was a security officer and a police officer with a sidearm that attempted to 
intervene, but the terrorists killed both. Initially, the hostages were separated by gender, 
147 Steve Banovac, Peter Dillon, Matthew Hennessy, Ronald Idoko, Christine Patterson, Augustine 
Paul, Ian Sonneborn, Christina Steve, and Kate Stubbe, Anatomy of a Terrorist Attack: Terror at Beslan: A 
Chronicle of On-Going Tragedy and a Government’s Failed Response (Pittsburgh, PA: Matthew B. 
Ridgeway Center, University of Pittsburgh, 2007). 
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CO: Archangel Group, 2005).  
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and several male hostages were immediately killed to reduce the risk of the terrorists 
being overpowered.149  While in the gym, the hostage takers killed individuals to make 
examples out of them to others and they raped girls in front of others.   
This attack was clearly planned. Furthermore, one of the attackers was previously 
a student at the school, and a perpetrator was found having the floor plan of the school on 
his person.150 
The Russian police response involved several agencies, and there was confusion 
as to who was in charge of the incident. This was despite a recent reorganization where 
authority in hostage situations was regionalized and had become the responsibility of the 
Ministry of Internal Affairs. The response was so disjointed that decision makers from 
organizations were not included as plans were dialogued. Ultimately, President Putin 
ordered that the Federal Security Service (FSB) be in charge of the operation. The 
breakdown of incident command led to other consequences, such as family members of 
the hostages swarming the school in an effort to safe their loved ones. The tactics and 
weapons used by the Russians included flamethrowers, snipers, and tanks munitions, 
which were attributed to the deaths of some of the hostages. Some of deaths and injuries 
were attributed to the building pieces that collapsed on the hostages, injuring and killing 
them.151 
B. THE MENTAL CONDITION OF THE SHOOTERS 
The shooters in Beslan were Chechen terrorists inclusive of Arabs and Russians. 
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In addition there was a psychological impact of terrorism to a community.152  These 
terrorists committed their actions against innocent children in an effort to bring about 
political change in Russia.153 
C. ACTIVITY PRIOR TO THE SHOOTING 
Russian intelligence sources had information approximately eight days prior to 
the Beslan incident that an attack in the region was going to occur, but they did not know 
exactly where. On August 18, 2004 (two weeks before the attacks), the Ministry of 
Internal (MVD) affairs confirmed an attack was being planned and communicated such to 
the police organizations in the area. On August 21 and August 31, 2004, the MVD issued 
orders to the security services in the area to increase security at the local schools during 
the first day of school, September 1, 2004. The local community in Beslan was aware that 
rebels had penetrated the area and community members that were driving had been 
stopped and their vehicles had been searched. This information came out in testimony 
after the incident, and the same individual also testified that there was a lack of police 
presence during the opening day at the school.154  
On the morning of the attack, additional information came from a suspect, 
arrested on unrelated charges federal authorities that a school was going to be seized. 
This important information was not communicated to the local police, and there was a 
lack of police presence around the school. The school had not been informed regarding 
any of the threats—not those known weeks before the attacks and not the information 
obtained during the day of the siege.155 According to report to the Russian Parliament, 
only one local, female, unarmed, police officer was placed at the school.156  That police 
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officer was taken hostage by the terrorists. The report also criticized the disorganized 
effort, misuses of tactics, and the lack of command and control of the incident.157 
D. INFORMATION SHARING BETWEEN SCHOOLS, LAW 
ENFORCEMENT, GOVERNMENT, AND MEDICAL TREATMENT 
INSTITUTIONS 
Beslan is a prime example of a lack of communication between the stakeholders 
involved. As previously stated, the police knew of potential attacks and they did not 
inform the schools.158 
E. ANALYSIS 
The authorities involved in the Beslan incident received criticism as to how it was 
handled. The criticism is appropriate given the way the entire incident was handled: the 
breakdown in communication between Russian intelligence sources and law enforcement, 
the lack of prevention efforts by the police, failure to notify the schools regarding threats 
of a possible attack, and the lack of appropriate operational tactics during the event.159  
What was worthy of recognition was the extended psychological treatment programs 
offered by the Russian government for those students and family members involved in 
the incident. While both prevention and response tactics are important, prevention effort 
should be given primary attention. Prevention is possible through collaboration between 
schools and law enforcement.  
Russian intelligence authorities had received information regarding possible 
attacks and communicated the threat to local law enforcement, but they failed to notify 
the schools.160 Even worse, the communication within the Russian intelligence  
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community had strong signals of the planned attacks. A preliminary dissemination of 
information was provided to the police, but Russian intelligence did not maintain a 
vigilant effort to keep the police updated.   
This proved to be a fatal error as the Beslan incident unfolded. The information 
and intelligence that should have been passed to the police would be needed by the 
schools in Beslan. The schools could have then planned with the police on what message 
to send out to the students and parents. Had the schools had communication with the 
police, an awareness and warning messages could have been disseminated to the 
community and parents. The schools could have increased security on campus, requested 
armed police officers to be present, and the staff and administrators could have had a 
heightened sense of situational awareness. The uniqueness of this particular case is only 
centered on the fact that it happened abroad. However, the theme that this case has in 
common with the previous U.S. school shootings case studies described above is the lack 
of information sharing between the stakeholders. The following chapter will discuss the 











The case studies of the four schools shootings, Virginia Tech, Sandy Hook, Green 
Junior High and Beslan, have similarities and differences. These four shootings occurred 
after the Columbine High School shooting and in all four of them resulted in a loss of 
life. The Green Junior High School shooting had one student life lost, while the Sandy 
Hook and Virginia Tech shootings had dozens of lives lost, including students and 
teachers. The Beslan School shooting had over 300 lives lost, including students, 
children, law enforcement, paramedics, security guards, and parents. All of these 
incidents had a huge impact on the surviving students, parents, teachers, community, and 
law enforcement. Tragically, in all of the shootings, all of the stakeholders involved in 
these incidents failed to synthesize all of the information in the circumstances. 
All four incidents involved planning on the part of the shooters. For example, in 
the Virginia Tech incident, Cho had purchased weapons and ammunition, practiced 
chaining the schools doors shut, conducted a practice run, and made a manifesto video. In 
the Sandy Hook incident, Lanza visited the school the day prior. He armed himself with 
weapons and dressed in military style clothing. In addition, he murdered his mother 
before heading to the school and committing the murders there. In Beslan, the attackers 
had gone to the school and concealed weapons so they could have them available once 
they infiltrated the school. Finally, in the E. O. Green shooting, McInerney went home 
and retrieved a weapon, then came back and shot the victim 
Both the Beslan shooting and the Sandy Hook shootings were external threats, 
meaning that perpetrators were not current students, but importantly, both these incidents 
involved shooters that had previously attended the schools they entered and committed 
the shootings. Beslan’s shooters were heavily armed terrorists with machine guns and 
bombs, while Sandy Hook was a sole shooter armed with semi-automatic handguns and a 
military style Bushmaster assault rifle. In both of these shootings, the shooters defeated 
the school security systems. Lanza shot through the locked doors and made his way into 
the school. In Beslan, a security guard and a police officer with a sidearm were killed by 
the shooters upon them advancing on the school.   
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The Virginia Tech and the Green Junior High School shootings were internal 
threats since the shooters were students enrolled in school at the time they committed the 
shootings. In addition, both Cho and McInerney had displayed signs of aggression and 
instability while in the school environment. For example, Cho had displayed insecurities 
upon first entering Virginia Tech as a student; he had issues with his roommates, 
harassed other students, displayed murderous and suicidal thoughts in his papers, had 
psychological counseling, was committed for a psychiatric evaluation for being a danger 
to self and others, and had gotten in arguments with professors. McInerney had been 
involved in confrontations and had made threats; he had recruited other students to 
assault King, and said he was going to bring a gun to school.   
In Beslan, Sandy Hook, and Virginia Tech, the shooters committed suicide before 
law enforcement could take them into custody. These incidents happened within minutes, 
and minutes matter in an active shooter situation. The only exception was the Beslan 
shooting where terrorists took over the school and held hostages in a three-day siege. The 
shooter in the Green Junior High incident was apprehended for the shooting immediately 
by Oxnard police officers; the shooter was later tried in a court of law and sentenced to 
prison after a plea bargain. 
In all of the case studies, there were signs of concern that were either ignored, or 
not synthesized to the point where information sharing between the schools and law 
enforcement, and vice versa, should have occurred. In Virginia Tech, various school 
departments picked up on Cho’s actions. Although there were reports of Cho’s conduct to 
the school and law enforcement, the two entities had a disconnection even when they 
were operating under the same umbrella. For example, at Virginia Tech, law enforcement 
is an integral component of the school. In Sandy Hook, the shooter had caused a 
disturbance at the school the day prior. With school shootings occurring year after year in 
different parts of the country and the world, any type of disturbance should have been 
reported.   
With Green Jr. High shooting, there were tensions between students on campus. 
Teachers interpreted those tensions leading to something serious in the future, yet law 
enforcement was not notified. At a minimum, there could have been a uniform presence 
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on campus before school, after school, as well as break and lunch time. In Beslan, the 
failure to communicate intelligence information regarding threats to the schools rests on 
the law enforcement side. Law enforcement authorities did not effectively communicate 
the threat to the school, and the school did not have any advance warning that something 
might happen in Beslan. It is the lack of communication, failure of communication, and 
the inability to synthesize the totality of the situations in these case studies that support 
the recommendations addressed later in the paper; specifically, the sharing of information 
as a them between law enforcement and the schools and vice versa.   
The following chapter will describe recommendations to the school and law 
enforcement community. There needs to be changes in the organizational culture for both 
law enforcement and school districts. These changes need to occur in the area of 










A. IMPROVEMENTS NEEDED TO THE PROCESS-ADVANCED 
PLANNING 
There are a number of lessons to be learned from these case studies. Two 
important lessons learned from the attackers are that they talk about their plans and that 
they make plans.161  If the shooters talk about their plans, then the school administrators, 
law enforcement personnel, paramedics, medical staff, parents, and community members 
should also be talking about and making their plans should a shooting tragedy might 
occur. It was evident in the Beslan siege, the Sandy Hook Elementary shooting, E. O. 
Green Junior High shooting, and the Virginia Tech shooting that the shooters made plans 
to commit their acts. Beslan was a coordinated terror attack on the school, the Sandy 
Hook and Virginia Tech shooters had prepared themselves with assault rifles and 
multiple handguns as well as additional ammunition, and the Green Junior High shooter 
had stated he was going to bring a gun to school and he did just that. The planning 
between law enforcement and the schools needs to be more intense than the shooters. 
U.S. jurisdictions have an adequate system of distributing intelligence and 
information thru regional task forces and local law enforcement distribution channels. 
Early collaboration and information sharing with the schools regarding threats is 
important. Examples would be receiving information from fusion centers, mining of 
social media sites by law enforcement, and/or from threats originating inside of the 
schools. The goal is to include school officials in the dissemination of the information 
early on after receiving it from the fusion centers and law enforcement agencies. This 
will allow for dialogue between law enforcement and the school administrators and in 
turn will lead to an analysis of vulnerabilities, both at the school facilities and the 
response capabilities. Police management in the United States have altered policy related 
161 U.S. Secret Service, “Preventing School Shootings.”  
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to school shootings and now send reminders to patrol personnel asking officers to remain 
visible around schools following school shootings.162 
The See Something Say Something Campaign163should be used as a template for 
increasing situational awareness of students, parents, teachers, administrators on school 
campuses, and law enforcement. Law enforcement needs to use available software to 
mine social media sites to uncover conversations by individuals regarding school 
shootings. This information should then be shared with school officials, who could 
provide additional information regarding the student or students in question. Similarly, 
schools need to provide information they come to learn regarding aggressive behavior, 
bullying, fighting, and threats with law enforcement. The intent would be to create a 
cycle of sharing information, evaluating, and conducting assessment as to the potential of 
violence on campus. The media, forums, newsletters, and informational fliers distributed 
to families in the school district can be used to create the campaign of awareness and 
reporting. While it will come with a cost to print and distribute fliers, the cost would be 
minimal as compared to a response to an incident, and incident costs increase due to 
negligence suits on behalf of the injured or killed. While the prevention component is 
extremely important, we will not be able to prevent 100 percent of school shootings in the 
future. As such, tactical strategic response procedures still need to be considered. 
The tactics used by the Russians showed there was a lack of communication 
between law enforcement agencies on scene; however, no incident commander was 
preliminary established. Nor was there a safety perimeter established to keep family 
members from intervening in the operation, and there was use of heavy artillery by the 
Russian forces on the school. The Russian’s were also criticized for not initiating 
negotiations with the Chechen leader, Mashkadov, known for planning the siege.164  This 
is in contrast to law enforcement practices in the United States, where secure perimeters 
162 Theresa Goldman, “90 Day Response Protocol for Calls for Service at Schools,” (internal 
communication, Glendale Police Department, Glendale, CA, January 4, 2013). 
163 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, “If You See Something Say Something Campaign,” last 
updated July 2010, http://www.dhs.gov/if-you-see-something-say-something%E2%84%A2-campaign. 
164 Paul QuinJudge, “Dark Memories One Year on, the Horror of the School Siege Still Haunts 
Beslan—and Russia,” Time International, September 5, 2005, Atlantic edition, 22. 
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are established and an incident commander is designated early on. Additionally, a 
command post is established where decision makers are all present. In Beslan, the parents 
and family members attempted to save their children and loved ones, which created the 
unintended consequence of hindering the operation.   
Advance planning and scouting of command post locations, media staging, parent 
staging locations,, ingress and egress of traffic, and mutual aid response routes with input 
from the schools is necessary. This would be further broken down in the plan for 
emergency responder vehicles consisting of fire trucks, fire engines, ambulances, 
vehicles from mutual aid agencies, and other equipment such as S.W.A.T. equipment 
trucks, command post vehicles, and rescue vehicles. Advance scouting and planning 
would also address the logistical component in a time of calmness, allowing for dynamic 
decision making to occur in resolving the incident at hand. If the first responders cannot 
get to the scene quickly, it increases the chances of additional people becoming victims; 
in an active shooter situation—time is off the essence. 
Advanced planning related to school shootings enables individuals to know their 
roles and responsibilities before a school shooting does occur. Plans are worthless if they 
are not put into place and practiced, and schools would be negligent for not having a plan. 
The Killology Research group advocates plans for law enforcement and schools districts 
to have in their plans sections that address the reporting of the incident, law enforcement 
response, roles of school staff, knowing the layout of the school, instructions to the 
students during an event, evacuations, lock downs, and incorporating the fire department 
as a resource.165 The importance of schools having a crisis plan is displayed in Ohio’s 
Senate Bill 1 that starting in 1999, made it mandatory for every school district in the state 
to have a crisis plan.166 
165 Dave Grossman, “School Shooting Contingency Plans & Considerations,” 2000, Killology 
Research Group, accessed October 5, 2013, http://www.killology.com/school_notes_plans.htm. 
166 Marc Dann, “Policy Analysis on School Safety,” accessed July 18, 2013, 
http://ohiocollaborative.org/downloads/policy-analysis-on-school-safety.pdf. 
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1. Information Sharing 
A one size fits all solution would be difficult to achieve; however, combining 
concepts from government, schools, and law enforcement in the area of preventing school 
shootings can induce collaboration between them. For example, New York, the Safe 
Schools against Violence in Education (SAVE) Act was passed and signed into law to 
address issues of school safety and violence prevention. The law amended various New 
York state laws and directed courts to provide schools with notification of criminal and 
juvenile delinquency adjudications against students.167  Here, the government of New 
York created a system where schools would receive information on their students that 
they otherwise would have not received. For example, students involved in felonious 
activities after school hours and away from school campuses could go to school the day 
after and the school officials would never be aware that the students were involved in 
criminal conduct. Students could also navigate through the entire criminal justice system 
without school administrators being aware.  
If school administrators are made aware of criminal conduct away from school 
committed by the students, the schools can monitor the students during school hours. By 
monitoring, the focus would be evaluative and rehabilitative. School can engage the 
professional services of school counselors to determine if the students would pose risks 
of committing violence, such as school shooting, on campus. The goal for juvenile 
offenders in the criminal justice system is to rehabilitate, and involving the school system 
could enhance that process.168  In the Virginia Tech case study, it became evident that the 
school was aware of Cho’s conduct and so was the campus police department; however, 
there was a lack of information sharing that led to the failure to synthesize.  
From the educational institutions side of preventing school violence, Arizona 
State University has a mandatory reporting policy for students. The policy, in relevant 
167 State Education Department and University of the State of New York, Safe Schools against 
Violence in Education Act Report to the Governor and Legislator (Albany, NY: State Education 
Department and University of the State of New York, 2004), 
http://www.p12.nysed.gov/irs/school_safety/2013/2004_SAVE_Report.pdf. 
168 California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation, “Division of Juvenile Justice,” last 
modified 2013, accessed June 4, 2013, http://www.cdcr.ca.gov/Juvenile_Justice/.  
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part, reads, “Reporting violations and suspected violations of Handling Disruptive, 
Threatening, or Violent Individuals on Campus, to ASU Police, the Dean of Students 
office, and other appropriate offices is MANDATORY.”169  This type of policy can be 
instituted at all school levels. From the earliest years in an educational environment, 
students experience bullying and fighting. If this type of mandatory reporting policy is 
instituted starting in kindergarten, it would condition students to report misconduct and 
counter reservations of being labeled as a snitch. One area where mandated reporting is in 
place is with domestic violence incidents. Studies in domestic violence reporting have 
shown that a majority of women that were abused favored a mandatory reporting 
scenario; they favored that emergency room physician’s report the occurrence to the 
police. In the same study, a majority of emergency room treating physicians believed that 
mandatory reporting policies to the police can increase the recognition and 
responsiveness to domestic violence, as well as improve and increase documentation and 
collection of statistics for those types of incidents.170  Something similar should be put in 
place for incidents of violence by students. 
Since states already have mandatory reporting requirements for teachers to report 
suspected child abuse to law enforcement and to the department of children’s services, 
laws can be amended to include mandatory reporting of violence on campus. Some 
districts may be against this as it may taint the school as being unsafe or unruly, but it is 
better to know what is occurring on campus and address the issue, rather than hide the 
facts and make a potential problem worse. According to the United States Department of 
Justice Reporting School Violence legal bulletin, reporting school violence to law 
enforcement provides the benefit of restoring school safety.171  Having a safe campus is a 
benefit for all the stakeholders: students, school officials, parents, law enforcement, and 
the community.   
169 “Arizona State University Policy STA Policy 104–2, Critical Incident Response Guidelines,” 
Arizona State University, accessed July 18, 2013, http://www.asu.edu/studentaffairs/crisis/threats.htm. 
170 Michael A. Rodriguez, Elizabeth McLoughlin, Gregory Nah, Jacquelyn C. Campbell, “Mandatory 
Reporting of Domestic Violence Injuries to the Police: What Do Emergency Department Patients Think?” 
American Medical Association 286, no. 5 (2001): 580–583. 
171 Office for Victims of Crime, U.S. Department of Justice, “Reporting School Violence” 
(Publication NCJ 189191), Legal Series Bulletin # 2, January 2002. 
 59 
                                                 
As schools report to law enforcement, law enforcement needs to reciprocate the 
reporting. Communities cannot operate in a vacuum. Besides having training on active 
shooters and emergency responses with the schools, law enforcement needs to improve 
its ability to prevent the incidents from occurring. One such way of improving the 
preventative measures of school shootings is to collaborate and share information with 
the schools regarding students that commit acts of violence away from campus. The state 
of Texas has set the example by enacting legislation making mandatory reporting for law 
enforcement to school officials involving crimes committed by students by passing the 
Safe Schools Act almost 20 years ago.172  A requirement of the Act is for law 
enforcement to notify the superintendent before the next school day or within 24 hours. 
This requirement is a force multiplier because it allows for a multidisciplinary approach 
to assessing, monitoring, and preventing violence because there is more that one pair of 
eyes looking at the problem. 
Taking examples from various states, educational institutions, and law 
enforcement agencies and combining their efforts creates synergy and innovative ways to 
address school shootings. The collective efforts between those agencies that collaborate 
far exceed the sums of individual entities acting alone in trying to solve a problem. With 
the recommendations above, it requires collaboration at many levels, starting from the 
individual level and rising to the organizational level, both intra and inter-disciplinary 
with institutions, as well as intra and inter-governmental at all levels. For things to 
progress, improve and move forward, it takes people to collaborate. One important 
component of collaboration is communication. The late Sergeant Jack Meier of the 
Glendale, California Police Department once said, “With communication you can build 
trust, and with trust you can lead!”173  It is going to take communication, trust, and 
leadership by people to create a cycle of sharing information between schools, law 
enforcement, and government to prevent and reduce school shootings. 
172 “Texas Safe Schools Act, Education Code, Title 2. Public Education, Subtitle G., Safe Schools, 
Chapter 37, Discipline; Law and Order, Subchapter A, Alternative Settings for Behavior Management,” 
Texas Education Agency, last modified September 2012, http://www.tea.state.tx.us/Chapter37.html. 
173 Jack Meier (Sergeant, Glendale, California Police Department), personal communication, 
February, 2007. 
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The key efforts to support information sharing necessary to reduce school 
shootings may be adopted by engaging three critical components: school administrators, 
law enforcement, and involved social peer groups, parents, and students. To start the 
information sharing process, schools and law enforcement can identify students that are 
involved in conduct that is of concern, such as committing violent crimes on and off 
campus, bullying, fighting, and making threats. Other individuals, such as other students, 
parents, teachers, and school staff, will likely know the conduct of the students involved.   
To demonstrate a strong potential of information sharing to be a possibility, the 
Glendale Unified School District in Glendale, California recently contracted with a social 
media-monitoring firm, Geo Listening, to monitor 13,000 middle and high school 
students’ postings on Facebook, YouTube, Instagram, and Twitter on issues related to 
cyber-bullying, truancy, vandalism, hate, harm, and substance abuse.174  After the 
schools receive a report from the vendor, the school can contact the on campus School 
Resource Officer (SRO), who is employed by the police department. The SRO can then 
investigate the situation and report back to the school with the findings. In addition, the 
SRO can also request additional resources from the department to do threat assessments, 
conduct interviews, place the student making a threat into a psychiatric treatment facility 
for evaluation, seek a search warrant if probable cause arises for the student’s residence, 
electronic devices and social media accounts, or make an arrest if necessary when a crime 
has been committed. To address issues of privacy, the company monitors those profiles 
where they are set to public, opening the profile for anyone to see. The firm has a privacy 
policy and cites that it complies with privacy laws.175  
Where there has been information sharing between schools and law enforcement 
in programs such as the Community Outreach through Police in Schools program, 
truancy prevention and intervention programs, and Gang Resistance Education and 
Training program (G.R.E.A.T.), these relationships that schools and police have formed 
174 Kelly Corrigan, “Glendale Is Paying Service to Monitor Students Online,” Glendale News Press, 
August 24, 2013, accessed October 5, 2013, http://articles.glendalenewspress.com/2013–08–24/news/tn-
gnp-me-monitoring-20130824_1_media-posts-high-school-students-instagram. 
175 “Geo Listening Monitoring Service Privacy Policy,” Geo Listening, last updated October 10, 2013, 
http://geolistening.com/privacy-policy/.  
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across the United States that have been shown to exhibit with some effectiveness.176  
Since previous programs involving information sharing between schools and law 
enforcement involving other programs have shown effectiveness, modifying the context 
from gangs to school shootings is prudent and likely to show improvement over time. 
A positive change in the paradigm shift as it relates to information sharing has 
been demonstrated through the creation of fusion centers at the state and local level. 
These fusion centers serve as a focal point for threat information sharing among public 
safety officials. Successes through this paradigm shift are reflected in the following 
fusion center success story a Fusion Center Aids in Preventing “Virginia Tech Style” 
attack. 
In January 2008, the Illinois Statewide Terrorism and Intelligence Center (STIC) 
received information that a Virginia man claimed to be travelling to the University of 
Illinois to kill a female and her boyfriend by committing a “Virginia Tech style” shooting 
on the campus. The STIC, in cooperation with the Virginia Fusion Center, produced and 
disseminated an intelligence alert to a network of hundreds of state and local law 
enforcement officers nationwide within two hours of the initial notification. The Virginia 
State Police worked with local law enforcement and located the suspect the next day 
where he was detained. The FBI subsequently adopted the case and filed charges. The 
defendant pled guilty to five counts of transmitting in interstate commerce and 
communications threatening to injure the person of another. The subject was sentenced to 
48 months in prison and will serve three years supervised parole.177 This is an example 
where effective interagency collaboration and communication averted a possible school 
shooting.  
176 Russell Wolff, School/Police Partnerships: Best Practices and Lessons Learned, Innovative 
Practices, Charles E. Shannon Jr. Community Safety Initiative Series (Boston, MA: Northeastern 
University Institute of Race and Justice, 2008).  
177 “Fusion Center Aids in Preventing ‘Virginia Tech Style’ Attack,” 2007–2009 Fusion Center 
Success Stories, U.S. Department of Homeland Security, January 2008, accessed October 5, 2013, 
http://www.dhs.gov/2007–2009-fusion-center-success-stories. 
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a. Frequent Meetings between Law Enforcement and School 
Officials 
In an effort to minimize potential school shootings in the future, school 
officials and law enforcement need to realize the importance of collaboration, specifically 
sharing information with each other about students as behavioral issues of students are 
identified and can become a threat. One way of accomplishing this is by having quarterly 
meetings between school officials and law enforcement representatives to establish a 
pattern of collaboration, communication, and trust. The U.S. Department of Education 
newsletter Barriers to Collaboration, acknowledges Dr. Larry Nocera of Glastonbury 
Public Schools when he describes trust as the key to interagency collaboration.178  Trust 
is built by training together and sharing the issues that connect individuals to help bridge 
differences and dissolve misperceptions about others.179  The prevention component of 
the preparedness for school shooting has been lacking, but is important, as seen in the 
Beslan case study, for threat information received by the government was not distributed 
down to the schools. Similarly, the Virginia Tech shooter had a long history of conduct 
that was concerning to both the university and the campus police department. This and 
the Green Junior High are prime examples where the importance of having periodic 
meetings between stakeholders to share information, confer regarding tensions, weigh 
alternatives, and evaluate intervention efforts is evident.   
Implementing communication between school officials and law 
enforcement is going to be necessary to increase safety at schools. School districts that 
have the benefit of having a School Resource Officer on campus can share information 
with the school from the police department and take back the information to the police 
department. Those districts that do not have an on campus officer need to have a 
commitment at the executive levels of communication between the chief of police and 
superintendent share information. The report, Fostering School-Law Enforcement  
 
 
178 REMS, “Highlights in the Field.” 
179 Ibid. 
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Partnerships, recommends holding daily conferences for about 15 minutes between 
school staff and the officer responsible for the school and weekly meetings for 
monitoring larger school safety activities.180  
2. Legislation 
After the Columbine School shooting, Colorado state legislators have enacted 
legislation to address information sharing between schools and law enforcement. 
Information sharing between law enforcement personnel and schools can assist with 
identifying potentially dangerous individuals and preventing attacks at schools. The 
Colorado law authorizes law enforcement to obtain school attendance and disciplinary 
records for students under investigation, authorized school administration to obtain 
records held by law enforcement agencies in the state, requires school officials to report 
crimes against school employees to law enforcement, and mandates that the prosecutors 
notify school officials when a juvenile is charged with crime or when a juvenile is 
convicted of a crime of violence of possession of controlled substances.181 Passage of the 
laws is part of the solution. It is going to require interpretation of the law by legal staff, 
implementation of policies in the spirit of the law, and adherence to the intent of the law. 
Without acceptance and adherence, the full potential benefit would not be realized. 
The passage of laws in other jurisdictions allowing sharing of information 
between schools and law enforcement will at the very least enable dialogue between the 
two entities. Even with the laws, there will be some individuals that misunderstand it, as 
was the case in the Virginia Tech shooting when there was a misunderstanding with 
regard to HIPAA, and as a result, psychological information regarding the perpetrator 
was not shared with others.182  There will be others that have their own belief that 
180 Anne Atkinson, Fostering School–Law Enforcement Partnerships, Safe And Secure: Guides To 
Creating Safer Schools (Portland, OR: Northwest Regional Educational Laboratory, 2002).  
181 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, “Lessons Learned: School Safety: Improving Information 
Sharing between School District and Law Enforcement Officials,” U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 
accessed October 12, 2013, 
http://www.dps.mo.gov/homelandsecurity/safeschools/documents/Information%20Sharing%20with%20La
w%20Enforcement%20Officials.pdf.  
182 TriData Division System Planning Corporation, Mass Shootings at Virginia Tech: Addendum to 
the Report of the Review Panel (Arlington, VA: TriData Division System Planning Corporation, 2009). 
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mandatory reporting will not be effective, as in the case of mandatory child abuse 
laws.183  As with other laws related to privacy, there are going to be challenges. From the 
outset, one challenge would be getting a member of the legislature to author or sponsor 
the bill. The process could take over a year, and then ultimately fail passage at first go 
around. In addition, there may be opponents for the law within legislature itself. If a law 
does pass, there could be critics from civil liberties organizations as well. There could be 
legal challenges such as injunctions, restraining orders, and lawsuits. If a law is 
successfully passed, then there is the process of communicating it, interpreting it, and 
coming up with policies related to it.   
While these may seem as challenges, it will open the door to collaboration. As 
Colorado and other places have demonstrated, passing successful legislation possible. 
What a mandatory reporting model, although not the perfect solution, would at least bring 
momentum for some type of action; action such as law enforcement visiting the child at 
home and talking to parents, inquiring about firearms, notifying the schools, schools 
notify law enforcement, counseling services and referrals being offered and the like. As 
Chief Bratton said, there needs to be collaboration in order not to perish.184 
The author constructed a model that may serve as example how effective 
collaboration amongst stakeholders would minimize the threat by sharing information in 
a timely manner. The recommended model would incorporate components from the legal, 
law enforcement, medical, and school districts would be a combining the following best 
practices from the various professions. For example, the New York system of schools 
reporting to law enforcement and the courts notifying the schools, the Texas system of 
law enforcement notifying the schools, the Arizona State University system of mandatory 
reporting if acts of violence or threats, the cross reporting between social  
 
183 Risé Jones, Emalee G. Flaherty, Helen J. Binns, Lori Lyn Price, Eric Slora, Dianna Abney, Donna 
L. Harris, Katherine Kaufer Christoffel and Robert D. Sege, “Clinicians’ Description of Factor Influencing 
Their Reporting of Suspected Child Abuse: Report of the Child Abuse Reporting Experience Study 
Research Group,” Pediatrics 122, no. 3 (2008): 259–266. 
184 William Bratton and Zachary Tumin, Collaborate or Parish: Reaching Across Boundaries in a 
Networked World (New York: Crown Publishing, 2012). 
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agencies and law enforcement in California, and the appropriate usage of HIPAA would 
create synergy and at least concentrate resources to those individuals that need the 
attention “left of boom.”185 
 
 
Figure 1.  Collaboration among stakeholders creates synergy toward addressing those 
individuals that may pose a threat of committing a school shooting.  
185 “Left of boom” is a term Dr. Paul Smith (Naval Postgraduate School) uses to describe for the 
intervention of stakeholders with those that are going through the radicalization process and becoming a 
terrorist. The analogy is used here in the context of those individuals that display characteristics that might 
lead them to commit a school shooting.  






                                                 
B. CHALLENGES IN IMPLEMENTATION 
1. Legal 
There are a number of challenges to implementing legal requirements to mandate 
collaboration between stakeholders for the prevention of shooter incidents. For example, 
blockades from privacy rights groups, such as the American Civil Liberties Union 
(ACLU), with regard to sharing information about the mental states of students would 
also be something to consider. Other challengers would be anti-government organizations 
and sovereign citizens. Another hurdle identified by this researcher is the reluctance of 
stakeholder organizations getting involved: schools, law enforcement, and the courts. 
These organizations may resist change, have lack of trust, and be unwilling to 
collaborate. Individuals will misinterpret the law, like the case in the Virginia Tech 
shooting; where due to HIPAA, information about the shooter was not shared.186   
This researcher proposes one solution to overcome legal hurdles is to have 
legislators author a bill to allow the sharing of information about students displaying 
signs of aggression or committing crimes between entities like schools, medical treatment 
facilities, and law enforcement. One example of such sharing would be the cross- 
reporting between law enforcement and Departments of Children and Family services or 
Adult Protective Services in California. It may take some time, but in the end positive 
results are likely as protecting children is a priority, and there are vast consequences 
when children are hurt or killed as a result of a school shooting. 
2. Change in Culture 
Diminishing budgets of first responders and school districts are detrimental to the 
planning component for response to school shootings. Unfortunately, training is often 
labeled as non-essential during conditions of economic decline for the stakeholders. 
Lieutenant Frazzano stated that when it is not always easy to see its immediate payoff, 
the training budget is usually the first to get cut in times of economic difficulty.187 The 
significance of training for non-routine events is necessary because it ensures that 
186 TriData Division System Planning Corporation, Mass Shootings at Virginia Tech. 
187 Frazzano, “Local Jurisdictions and Active Shooters.” 
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challenges faced during crises can be more effectively navigated, possibly saving 
lives.188 In addition, leaders need to realize the monies saved from cutting training 
budgets will cost them more in the future in terms of litigation, which can be costly, if a 
school shooting victim litigates for negligence related issues and for failure to train. The 
Guide for Preventing and Responding to School Violence describes that liability may be 
premised on failure to follow to current local, state, and federal school safety laws 
regarding school district safety policy.189  This confirms the old adage of an ounce of 
prevention is worth a pound of cure.   
The Guide for Preventing and Responding to School Violence identified another 
hindrance to the planning component is the not-in-my-backyard (NIMBY) mentality 
shared by all the stakeholders.190  The same report mentions that since 1992, more than 
40 schools have experienced multiple victim homicides in the very communities where 
people previously believed “it couldn’t happen here.”191 Overcoming attitudes like 
NIMBY would encourage buy-in from leaders from organizations where they see their 
communities as affluent, upper class, with a low crime rate, and fast police response 
times, where the likelihood of school shootings is seen as a problem in someone else’s 
backyard. The NIMBY mentality is contagious and leads to complacency across the 
board; law enforcement members do not think they will have a respond to a school 
shooting. In addition, the school administrators believe they do not have students that 
would engage in a shooting on campus, and the fire departments do not think that they 
will have dozens of individuals that have been shot and need to be transported to a 
medical care facility. Likewise, the local hospitals do not think that they will have a rush 
of gunshot victims any more that the community does believes that such a horrific action 
could take place where they live. Finally, few if any, parents believe that their child 
would ever do such a thing as taking a gun to school and shooting other students and 
188 Ibid. 




                                                 
teachers. This was the exact feeling of the parents that had children that were students at 
Sandy Hook; parents thought that a shooting could not happen in their community.192 
In order to change the organizational culture, an influential and powerful person 
at the top of the organization, or a large group of individuals from anywhere within the 
organization has to decide that the old ways of doing things are not working. The leader 
or the group would then need to figure out a change of vision and then start to act 
differently. As there is a transformation in progress, they need to enlist others to act 
differently as well. The National Information Sharing Strategy is a top down approach 
while the National Criminal Information Sharing Plan is a bottom up approach initiated 
by state and local officials that reflects the need to integrate and collaborate at all levels 
of government.193  The federal and local efforts to support information sharing is 
affirmed by the aforementioned statement by Chief Bratton regarding the critical need to 
be collaborate among stakeholders that institutions may not to parish.194  If these new 
actions produce better results that before, and if the results are communicated and 
celebrated throughout the organization, then the new norms will form and shared values 
will grow. The hindrance to organizational change occurs when the established culture is 
fighting the changes and keeping the transformation from occurring.195 
a. Schools 
The prevention component starts with the administration. The weight that 
they place on the importance of preventing a school shooting needs to be stressed as a 
priority and incorporated into the organizational culture and sustained long term. By 
having a strong culture of prevention, it reduces the propensity to stray away from it 
when there is a change in staff and administration.  
192 Alix Spiegal, “Shootings Leave Sandy Hook Survivors Rethinking the Odds,” NPR, December 27, 
2012, accessed September 23, 2013, http://www.npr.org/blogs/health/2012/12/27/168152215/shootings-
leave-sandy-hook-survivors-rethinking-the-odds. 
193 U.S. Department of Justice, The National Criminal Intelligence Sharing Plan; White House, 
National Strategy for Information Sharing. 
194 Bratton and Zachary Tumin, Collaborate or Parish. 
195 John Kotter, “The Key to Changing Organizational Culture,” Forbes, September 27, 2012. 
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School officials need to stay informed regarding current events related to 
school violence and shootings in other jurisdictions, especially those that have received 
vast media coverage. School staff needs to understand the copycat effect196 as other 
students contemplating suicide may resort to a school shooting after extensive media 
coverage of a shooting elsewhere. The teachers and staff need to be trained to recognize 
weak signals and behaviors of students that are similar to those attackers from previous 
shootings. Those behaviors have been identified by the Centers for Disease Control and 
Prevention (CDC) as behaviors such as bullying, slapping, punching, and weapon use.197  
Despite all the tragedies that have occurred with school shootings, there will still be 
individuals that have the NIMBY belief. 
Schools need to foster an environment of positive reinforcement for 
reporting the acts described above. This is easier said than done when it comes to 
adolescents. Teenagers want to be accepted by their peers and reporting another peer will 
likely get them labeled as a snitch. The study Code of Silence: Students’ Perceptions of 
School Climate and Willingness to Intervene in a Peer’s Dangerous Plan found that 
because of the normative tendency for adolescents to be sensitive to others’ impressions, 
they may be hesitant to act out of fear of reacting inappropriately or being labeled a narc 
or a snitch.198  Schools can offer rewards system for students that being forth information 
they have heard about from peers or seen on social media. As previously mentioned, 
studies have shown that those that have committed school shootings talk about their 
plans.199  With the advance of technology and social media, the platform that some of the 
talk that occurs is in cyber linked to cellular phones. Studies show that 75 percent of 
children between the ages of 12–17 own a cell phone, and the cell phone is the favored 
196 Loren Coleman, “The Copycat Effect: School Shootings and Recommendations.” In Confronting 
Violence in Our Schools: Planning, Response, and Recovery (New York: Simon and Schuster/Paraview 
Pocket, 2004). 
197 Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, “School Violence Fact Sheet,” 2010, 
http://stacks.cdc.gov/view/cdc/5538. 
198 Syvertsen, Flanagan, and Stout, Code of Silence. 
199 U.S. Secret Service. “Preventing School Shootings.” 
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communication device among American teens.200  With all the opportunities the schools 
have to interact with students, the schools can be in the forefront in bringing about the 
change in culture of students reporting incidents of concern. In turn, schools need to 
report what they learn to their local law enforcement agency having jurisdiction and 
responsibility for protecting their respective schools. 
The Virginia Tech School shooting resulted in lawsuits filed by family 
members against the state-run school for negligence related claims. A jury trial awarded 
$4 million each to two families that lost their loved ones in the massacre. The parties 
named as defendants in the lawsuit were the school’s president and the police chief for 
their actions in the way they handled the situation as it unfolded. The court process 
distilled the defendants to only those from the state of Virginia.201  Previously, there was 
an $11 million settlement for 24 families, as well as a $1.9 million disbursement into a 
hardship fund related to Virginia Tech. The parents of those families wanted the school to 
be accountable for their actions, and the verdicts spoke to the negligence of the school’s 
response and included the police department.202  The overall cost of the Virginia Tech 
massacre cost the taxpayers $48.2 million.203   
Like Virginia Tech, the Sandy Hook Elementary School shooting resulted 
in the loss of life and has also resulted in a lawsuit. A $100 million claim by bereaved 
families has been filed against the Connecticut Board of Education, Department of 
Education, and Education Commissioner.204  However, public backlash and comments 
posted on the attorney’s social media site prompted a temporary withdrawal of the 
200 Amanda Lenhart, Teens and Mobile Phones (Washington, DC: Pew Internet & American Life 
Project, Pew Research Center Publications, 2010), Pew Internet, 
http://pewinternet.org/Reports/2010/Teens-and-Mobile-Phones.aspx. 
201 Steve Szkotak, “Virginia Tech Shooting Lawsuit: Attorney Seeks $4 Million For 2 Families,” 
Huffington Post, March 28, 2012, accessed September 22, 2013, 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/03/28/virginia-tech-shooting-la_1_n_1386348.html. 
202 Szkotak, “Virginia Tech Shooting Lawsuit.” 
203 Anthony Green and Donna Cooper, Auditing the Cost of the Virginia Tech Massacre, How Much 
We Pay When Killers Kill (Washington, DC: Center for American Progress, 2012). 
204 Barbara Kellam-Scott, “Sandy Hook Lawsuit: Damages TBD, But Start with $100 Million,” 
December 20, 2012, Policymic, accessed September 22, 2013, 
http://www.policymic.com/articles/21628/sandy-hook-lawsuit-damages-tbd-but-start-with-100-million. 
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lawsuit, preserving rights to litigate at a later time.205  Similarly, the E. O. Green Junior 
High School shooting has also led to legal action. The family of the victim filed a claim 
against the school district for failing to protect Larry King.206  A lawsuit that followed 
the claim was eventually settled for over $250,000 with the majority of the payout from 
the suspect’s homeowner’s insurance company, as well as the school contributing 
$25,000.207 
b. Law Enforcement 
The fundamental premise of law enforcement is to protect life and 
property. When looking at this statement, one expects that in the time of a crisis law 
enforcement members will be called, and they will respond and handle the situation. 
When situations on campus turn into an active shooter incident, the schools call on law 
enforcement to handle the crisis. Law enforcement officers have received training on 
active shooters, but studies show that most of the schools shooting incidents end with 
intervention by someone other than a law enforcement officer. The United States Secret 
Service report, Preventing School Shootings, finds that most shooting incidents were not 
resolved by law enforcement intervention; more than half of the attacks ended before law 
enforcement responded to the scene despite law enforcement’s often rapid response.208 In 
these cases, either faculty or fellow students stopped the attacker, the attacker committed 
suicide, or the attacker stopped shooting on his own.209 
While protection of life could be achieved by sending in the S.W.A.T. 
team to neutralize a shooter on campus, it starts with the planning component of 
protecting life. Law enforcement management needs to embrace the reality of school 
205 Pauline Kim, “Backlash Prompts Newtown Survivor’s Attorney to Pull Lawsuit, For Now,” CNN, 
January 2, 2013, accessed September 22, 2013, http://www.cnn.com/2013/01/01/justice/connecticut-sandy-
hook-lawsuit/. 
206 Tami Abdollah, “Family Files Claims in Oxnard School Shooting,” Los Angeles Times, August 16, 
2008. Accessed September 22, 2013, http://articles.latimes.com/2008/aug/16/local/me-oxnard16. 
207 Greg Risling, “Larry King Murder: Gay Teen’s Death Illustrates Schools’ Challenge,” Huffington 
Post, November 24, 2011, accessed September 22, 2013, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/11/24/larry-
king-murder-gay-tee_n_1112241.html. 
208 U.S. Secret Service. “Preventing School Shootings.” 
209 Ibid. 
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violence and pass on the importance down the chain of command. Just like there have 
been paradigm shifts in law enforcement with regard to programs such as community 
policing and COMPSTAT, the same philosophies can be applied to prevention of school 
shootings. Community policing doctrine and COMPSTAT require collaboration with 
other stakeholders to solve problems. Policing paradigms now include intelligence-led 
policing; a method of analyzing factors and allocating resources to problem areas in 
efforts to reduce crime. By collaborating with the schools, the same can be accomplished. 
Some states have enacted legislation that requires law enforcement to 
report arrests of juveniles to the school district. For example, Texas state law requires 
peace officers to inform he school superintendent when a juvenile is arrested for felonies 
and certain misdemeanor crimes.210  While the mandatory reporting requirement is not a 
one-size-fits-all solution, it is at least headed in the right direction. With legislation 
backing the sharing of information, with specific limitations prohibiting distribution of 
information to unauthorized persons, it allows for information sharing and collaboration. 
With collaboration, at least the wheels can be put in motion. This type of legislation also 
takes away the fear of sharing information under the auspices that it is strictly 
confidential. Confidentiality laws protect individuals in society from unauthorized 
dissemination by both private sector and governmental employees. At times they can be a 
hindrance to collaboration when individuals that the law is directed to do not fully 
understand it, or use it as an excuse to not collaborate. Because a law is enacted does not 
necessarily mean it is going to be effective; mandatory reporting laws related to domestic 
violence arrests eliminate police inaction.211  Mandatory reporting on the public health 
side has shown to be effective in reducing the spread of healthcare associated infections. 
It brings about accountability and a level of review.212 
210 Texas Safe Schools Act 2012. 
211 Radha Iyengar, Does the Certainty of Arrest Reduce Domestic Violence? (Cambridge, MA, 
National Bureau of Economic Research, 2007). 
212 Center for Disease Control and Association of State and Territorial Health Officials, Policies for 
Eliminating Healthcare-Associated Infections: Lessons from State Stakeholder Engagement (Atlanta, GA: 
Center for Disease Control, Association of State and Territorial Health Officials, 2012). 
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One example of law enforcement failing to collaborate with schools is the 
2004 Beslan school siege. Russian intelligence sources had information approximately 
eight days prior that an attack in the region was going to occur, but they did not know 
exactly where.213  
C. AFTERMATH CONSIDERATIONS 
1. Psychological Treatment  
It is important to initiate dialogue with school officials concerning a long-term 
psychological treatment program for those individuals involved in a tragic incident such 
as a school shooting as this will reduce the strain on law enforcement responding to 
mental health related calls in the future. A study of the Beslan incident shows that acts of 
terrorism negatively impact the mental health of children and families.214 In the event 
there is an active shooter situation, there is going to be a need to deal with aftermath of 
the psychological impact of the students and family members involved in the incident. 
Research has indicated that children exposed to terrorism-induced trauma, both directly 
and indirectly, are at risk of developing adverse psychological symptoms afterwards.215   
A study was conducted on coping strategies regarding the subsequent 
development of psychological distress, and emotional and behavioral problems as a result 
of being involved in the Beslan siege.216  Specifically, children that were involved in 
Beslan performed significantly less well than the controls in the study in the areas of 
attention, memory, and visual-spatial performance.217  Law enforcement and fire 
personnel have a mechanism to debrief the first responders with psychologists, and 
213 Banovac et al., Anatomy of a Terrorist Attack. 
214 Ughetta Moscardino, Giovanna Axia, Sara Scrimm, and Fabia Capello, “Narratives from 
Caregivers of Children Surviving the Terrorist Attack in Beslan: Issues of Health, Culture, and Resilience,” 
Social Science and Medicine 64, no. 8 (2007): 1776–1787. 
215 Peter Van der Velden, “Long-Term Effects of the Terrorist Attack in Beslan on Adolescent 
Survivors,” Journal of Clinical Psychiatry 70, no. 6 (2009): 934–935. 
216 Melissa DelBello, “Mood Disorders: Assessment, Risk Factors, and Outcome,” Journal of Clinical 
Psychiatry 69, no. 5 (2008): 830. 
217 Sara Scrimin, Ughetta Moscardino, Fabia Capello, Giovanna Axia, “Attention and Memory in 
School-Age Children Surviving the Terrorist Attack in Beslan, Russia,” Journal of Clinical Child and 
Adolescent Psychology 38, no. 3 (2009): 402. 
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schools have counselors and psychologists available immediately after the incident. What 
Russia did in Beslan was initiate a long-term psychological treatment program to deal 
with the effects of the posttraumatic syndrome disorder for the students involved. The 
long term treatment plan was well thought out in Russia; psychologists were introduced 
to the local hospitals where they previously did not exist, training local doctors and 
teachers who are likely to come into contact with victims, and incorporating natural 
support systems of teachers, family, and peers.218  Clinical Psychologist Sean Perrin at 
the Child Traumatic Stress Clinic at the Maudsley hospital in London reinforced the 
long-term treatment program the Russians instituted as the lack of early intervention by 
trained psychologists can negatively impact the victims involved.219   
Although this is a governmental program in Russia, this lesson could be used in 
the U.S. A school psychologist in collaboration with a police psychologist should devise 
a treatment plan where student and family members are monitored, given psychological 
treatment, and referred through the health insurance network for continuous mental health 
treatment. This long-term approach would benefit in reducing the strain to law 
enforcement for responses to situations where law enforcement responds to calls 
involving mental health situations.220  A discussion of the benefits of the long-term 
treatment programs need to occur between school superintendents and the head law 
enforcement official having jurisdiction in the area of the school prior to an incident. 
The aftermath of the Beslan incident included the state sponsored psychological 
treatment of the survivors and the children involved. This was such a horrific event that 
the psychological damage not only impacted those children and parents directly involved, 
but impacted parents and children outside of Beslan.221  The team of doctors organized a 
24-hour hotline and psychologists were dispatched to morgues where families were 
identifying the remains of their relatives. In addition to the hostages and parents being 
218 Tom Parfitt, “How Beslan’s Children Are Learning to Cope,” The Lancet 364, no. 9450, (2004): 
2009–2010. 
219 Ibid. 
220 Michael Biosotti, “The Management of the Severely Mentally Ill and its Effects on Homeland 
Security,” master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2011. 
221Parfitt, “How Beslan’s Children Are Learning to Cope.” 
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affected, others included journalists, ambulance drivers, medical staff, and teachers. A 
local psychological treatment program was instituted in Beslan, inclusive of therapy, and 
a three-week rehabilitation program. The program was a component of the Federal Centre 
for Disaster Psychiatry, which was initially set up in 1988 after the earthquake in Spitak, 
Armenia. The program expanded to train natural support systems, which included peers, 
family, and teachers.222  
222 Ibid 
 76 
                                                 
VIII. CONCLUSION 
School shootings have happened in the past and, unfortunately, will continue to 
happen in the future, placing importance on the prevention aspect alongside the 
appropriate tactical response to safely eliminate the threat to those on school campuses. 
There needs to be collaboration between schools and law enforcement on a continuous 
basis. Law enforcement needs to plan its tactics and responses prior to an incident taking 
place. During the aftermath of an incident, there needs to be long-term psychological 
services available to those impacted. Finally, there needs to be quarterly meetings 
between the schools and law enforcement to keep the issue on the forefront. School 
shootings have made history, and they will continue to occur. Planning and collaborations 
needs to continue where it exists and needs to start where it does not. Law enforcement, 
schools, media, first responders, and medical staff need to work together to keep their 
communities safe and be in a position to best handle a school attack when it occurs.   
The importance is expressed in the Report to the President on Issues Raised by 
the Virginia Tech Tragedy. It states that many states and communities that have adopted 
emergency preparedness and violence prevention plans to address school and community 
violence; however, the challenge is fully implementing these programs through practice 
and effective communication.223  Putting plans into practice is necessary to do sooner 
than later. Just as important as the planning component is the necessity for schools and 
law enforcement to share information. The failure to share information from the law 
enforcement component to the schools left over 300 students, parents, and teachers dead 
in Beslan.   
The combined failure of the school and the law enforcement component within 
the school at Virginia Tech left 32 students and faculty dead, and the Sandy Hook 
shooting left 26 students and teachers dead. In the Sandy Hook incident, the shooter had 
been involved in an altercation with school staff the day prior to the shooting, and on the 
day of the shooting he targeted those he was involved in an altercation with. Since the 
223 Leavitt, Spellings, and Gonzalez, Report to the President.  
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conduct of aggression, bullying, and fighting has been identified as areas for concern, 
schools and law enforcement should be cross-reporting incidents that come to their 
collective attention. When incidents are brought to each other’s attention, then at the very 
least a decision could be made as how to proceed to conduct threat assessment, follow up 
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